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Prosecutorial Discovery and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination: Accommodation
or Capitulation
By

GORDON VAN KESSEL*

Introduction
[O]ur Bill of Rights guarantees are essential to individual liberty
and . . . they state their own values leaving no room for courts to
"weigh"' them out of the Constitution.'
[The People suggest] a balancing test in which the state's interest is
weighed against and may offset the accused's interest in the risk of
self-incrimination] leaves
self-incrimination. [The privilege against
2
no room for a balancing of interests.
Perhaps no other constitutional guarantee offers a judge a more difficult
challenge or more clearly reveals his assessment of the relative importance
of primary constitutional values than the privilege against self-incrimination, particularly when asserted by a criminal defendant in the face of a
prosecutor's request for pre-trial discovery. On the one hand, our system of
criminal justice is based upon an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial
method of fact determination, and the privilege against self-incrimination is
the "mainstay" of that system. 3 In order to maintain a proper balance
between the state's interest in law enforcement and the individual's right to
freedom from unjustified restraint, the state has the burden of proving the
defendant's guilt. Moreover, the state must respect the dignity of the
individual in meeting its burden; the prosecution may not resort to coercion
of evidence from the lips of the accused, rendering him an unwilling
instrument of his own destruction. 4 It follows that a defendant should not be
*

B.A., 1962, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1965, University of California,

Berkeley. Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 134 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
2. Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 525, 557 P.2d 65, 67, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774, 776
(1976) (Wright, C.J., writing for the majority).
3. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); see, e.g., Murphy-v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 55 (1964). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughton rev. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
4. Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414 (1966); WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2251, at 315-18.
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compelled to give incriminating evidence to the prosecution under the guise
of pre-trial discovery.
On the other hand, the adversary system is not an end in itself. A
principal justification for the system is the belief that a reasonable approximation of the truth will emerge from the clash of opposing positions. This
will not occur, however, unless both adversaries are aware of the relevant
evidence and have had a reasonable opportunity to investigate and prepare
for their encounter. 5 Recognition of the state's superior resources and more
effective position as a factfinder suggests that it should, to some extent,
share its information with the defense. The discovery process must, however, necessarily be reciprocal; otherwise, the state would be left at such a
disadvantage that the integrity of the adversary system would be severely
compromised.
During his term on the California Supreme Court, Chief Justice Donald
R. Wright twice faced what Professor Louisell has characterized as the
"hard questions" 6 involved in attempting to resolve the conflicts inherent in
these fundamental values. In Reynolds v. Superior Court,7 the California
Supreme Court struck down a trial court discovery order directing the
defendant to give advance notice of alibi witnesses. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Wright concluded that the court should refrain from
creating a notice-of-alibi rule by judicial decision because of the intricate
state and federal constitutional questions involved and should thus defer
judgment on the constitutionality of such a rule until enacted by the legislature. In Allen v. Superior Court,8 Chief Justice Wright again wrote the
majority opinion in which the court reviewed a trial court order directing
disclosure of the names of prospective prosecution and defense witnesses for
the purpose of discovering any acquaintance with the prospective jurors.
Although the order was not couched in terms of pre-trial discovery, it was
found to impinge upon the privilege against self-incrimination because it
could "conceivably . . .lighten the prosecution's burden of proving its
case-in-chief" 9 and therefore might "possibly have a tendency to incriminate" the defendant.' 0
While aware of the need for judicial efficiency in pre-trial discovery,
Chief Justice Wright demonstrated in both cases his respect for the privilege
5. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1970); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in
CriminalDiscovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 228 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Traynor].
6. Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination:Roger Traynor Confronts the

Dilemma, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 89 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Louisell].
7. 12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974).
8. 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1976).

9. Id. at 525, 557 P.2d at 67, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 776 (emphasis ommitted) (quoting
Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 326, 466 P.2d 673, 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133

(1970)).
10. Id. at 520, 526, 557 P.2d at 68, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
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against self-incrimination and his determination to limit encroachments
upon it. His broad view of the privilege in the context of prosecutorial
discovery was, however, contrary to both that held by his predecessor,
Chief Justice Roger Traynor, and the view to which a majority of the United
States Supreme Court now subscribe. II It is their belief that limited prosecutorial discovery should be allowed because the mere acceleration of disclosure does not constitute compulsion within the meaning of the privilege.
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Wright, therefore, the California
Supreme Court has embarked upon an independent and far-reaching interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination under the California
Constitution.
The purpose of this article is to determine whether a proper interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination permits any form of prosecutorial discovery of defense evidence. Part I will initially focus on the
development of prosecutorial discovery in California in light of concurrent
rulings of the United States Supreme Court. The present status of the
California rule, as articulated by Chief Justice Wright, will then be reviewed. In Part II, the author analyzes the threat prosecutorial discovery
poses to the values protected by the privilege. The dangers posed by the
manner in which the prosecution intends to use defense evidence will be
specifically addressed. This analysis will be followed by an examination of
the state's interest in the effective operation of the criminal justice system.
Finally, possible avenues of accommodation will be suggested and evaluated. In light of the difficulty in arriving at an accommodation that will both
permit prosecutorial discovery and remain solicitous of the values underlying the privilege, the author concludes that California courts should proceed
with caution when considering prosecutorial requests for reciprocal discovery rights.
I.

Development of Prosecutorial Discovery in California

A. Changing the Direction of Traffic
Until two decades ago, criminal discovery in California, as in other
jurisdictions, was the stepchild of the law. While there was both experimentation with criminal discovery and a trend toward more liberal discovery
rules, most jurisdictions took a position similar to that of the federal courtsthey remained cautious. Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court embarked upon a full-scale expansion of criminal discovery for the defense in
1956.12 By the mid-1960's, California was at the forefront of all other
11. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Traynor, supra note 5.
12. See People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956).
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jurisdictions in the development of criminal defense discovery. 13 The liberal
principles articulated by Chief Justice Traynor, in fact, continue to be relied
upon today by the California Supreme Court:
Defendant must show better cause for discovery "than a mere
desire for the benefit of all information which has been obtained by
the People in their investigation of the crime." A showing, however, that the defendant cannot readily obtain the information
through his own efforts will ordinarily entitle him to pretrial knowledge of any unprivileged evidence, or information that might lead
to the discovery of evidence, if it appears reasonable that such
knowledge will assist him in preparing his defense. 4
In 1962, the California Supreme Court confronted the prosecutor's
demand for a quid pro quo. In Jones v. Superior Court,' 5 the court
affirmed, in part, an order granting a prosecutor's pre-trial motion to
discover evidence relating to a particular defense that the defendant had
previously revealed he would claim against a charge of rape. On the day of
his trial the defendant moved for a continuance on the ground that he should
be allowed to gather medical reports showing that he had suffered injuries
that had rendered him impotent. The motion was granted, and four days
later the prosecution filed a motion for discovery requesting: (1) the names
and addresses of all physicians and surgeons subpoenaed to testify on the
defendant's behalf with respect to the claimed injuries; (2) the names and
addresses of all physicians who had treated defendant prior to trial; (3) all
medical reports pertaining to the physical condition of the defendant in
regard to the injuries and the question of impotence; and (4) all x-rays of
defendant taken immediately following the injuries. The trial court granted
the motion over the defendant's objection. The defendant then sought a writ
of prohibition from the California Supreme Court.
Writing for the court, Justice Traynor acknowledged that the order
would violate the privilege against self-incrimination to the extent that it
sought the benefit of the defendant's knowledge of the existence of possible
witnesses, reports, or x-rays. Moreover, to the extent that it sought reports
made by physicians to whom defendant had been sent by his attorney for
examination, Justice Traynor recognized that the order would violate the
attorney-client privilege. With respect to the names and addresses of witnesses defendant intended to introduce at trial, however, Justice Traynor felt
that this information was analogous to alibi evidence, which may be com13. Louisell, supra note 6, at 90; Traynor supra note 5, at 229-30. The phenomenal growth

of criminal discovery in California has been noted earlier. See Louisell, CriminalDiscovery:
Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56, 59 (1961). See also Fletcher, Pretrial
Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 293, 297 (1960).

14. Traynor, supra note 5, at 244.
15. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
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pelled without violation of the privilege because the defendant would voluntarily disclose such evidence at trial.
The identity of the defense witnesses and the existence of any
reports or X-rays the defense offers in evidence will necessarily be
revealed at the trial. The witnesses will be subject to study and
challenge. Learning the identity of the defense witnesses and of
reports and X-rays in advance merely enables the prosecution to
perform its function at the trial more effectively.16
Accordingly, the court upheld that part of the discovery order pertaining to
"the names of the witnesses . . . [defendant intended] to call and any
reports and x-rays he [intended] to introduce in evidence in support of his
affirmative defense of impotence." 7 Justice Traynor emphasized both the
recent advances in criminal discovery for the defense and the importance of
discovery in general as a device by which to ascertain the truth in criminal as
well as civil cases. Absent some governmental requirement of secrecy, "the
state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can
throw light on issues in the case." 18 Conversely, "absent a privilege...,
the defendant in a criminal case has no valid interest in denying the
prosecution access to evidence . ... 19 Since the purpose of pre-trial
discovery is to ascertain the truth, Justice Traynor concluded that "[t]hat
procedure should not be a one-way street. "20
In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Peters strongly objected to that part
of the decision upholding the discovery order. According to his view, the
reasoning of the majority "fundamentally alters our concepts of the rights of
the accused and forces him to come forward with evidence before the
prosecution has presented its case against him.' '21 Justice Peters noted that
"until today . . . a defendant [in California] could weigh his proposed
evidence against the prosecution's case, and not make up his mind until he
heard the strength or weakness of the case against him whether he would
rely on a straight not guilty defense or urge an 'affirmative defense.' Now he
must make that decision before the state's presentation. "22 While cognizant
that a criminal trial should be fair to the prosecution as well as to the
defense, Justice Peters emphasized that the defendant has additional constitutional and statutory rights not given to the prosecution. He reasoned that
all of these rights-the right not to incriminate oneself, the right to remain
mute until a prima facie case has been established, the right to the presump16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 61,
Id.
Id.at 59,
Id.
Id. at 60,
Id.at 65,
Id.at 66,

372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
372 P.2d at 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
372 P.2d at 924, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 884 (Peters, J., dissenting).
372 P.2d at 925, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 885 (Peters, J., dissenting).
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tion of innocence until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt-demonstrate "that our system of criminal procedure is founded upon the principle
that the ascertainment of the facts is a 'one-way street.' "23
At the time of the Jones decision, the United States Supreme Court was
embarking upon the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the due
process clause, which is enforceable against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 Because the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination had not, as yet, been incorporated,2 5 however, the Jones
opinion relied on an interpretation of the privilege as contained in the
California Constitution. Two broad currents were thus forming at the same
time, but they appeared to run in different directions. On the one hand, trial
and appellate courts in California were experimenting with various forms of
prosecutorial discovery, thus bearing out Justice Peters' admonition that
Jones would not be limited to particular and narrow "affirmative defenses"
but would be extended to "any defense other than a mere attempt to refute
the prosecution's witnesses.' '26 On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court applied the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the states,27 and began to show a greater concern for protection of the
privilege both at the trial and at the pre-accusatory stage of criminal pro28
ceedings.
The California Supreme Court squarely faced these two cross-currents
in 1970 when it was forced to interpret the Fifth Amendment privilege in the
case of Prudhomme v. Superior Court.29 In that case, a discovery order
attempted to compel the defense attorney to disclose the names, addresses,
and expected testimony of the witnesses the defendant intended to call at
trial. In recognition of the increasing scope of the Fifth Amendment guarantee as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court and of the Court's
recent grant of certiorari in a case upholding Florida's notice-of-alibi statute
against a claim that it violated that Amendment, 30 the court reasoned that,
23. Id. at 64, 372 P.2d at 924, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 884 (Peters, J., dissenting).
24. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
25. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
26. 58 Cal. 2d at 66, 372 P.2d at 925, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 885. See People v. Pike, 71 Cal. 2d
595, 455 P.2d 776, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1969); Ruiz v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. App. 2d 633, 80
Cal. Rptr. 523 (1969); McGuire v. Superior Court, 274 Cal. App. 2d 583, 79 Cal. Rptr. 155
(1969); People v. Dugas, 242 Cal. App. 2d 244, 51 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1966).
27. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
28. Adverse comment or instruction on a defendant's invocation of the privilege at the
time of trial was forbidden on the ground that it would make invocation of the privilege more
costly. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Strict procedural protections were enunciated
for the maintenance of the privilege during the investigatory stage. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
29. 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
30. Id. at 324, 466 P.2d at 675, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 131. The court also noted that the existing
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allowed prosecutorial discovery of physical evidence
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significant developments in the law since Jones.

.

. caution us not

to extend its holding beyond its facts without careful consideration
of the possible effects which such extension could have upon the
accused's rights and privileges, and especially his fundamental
right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. 31
The court concluded that the state must bear the burden of proving its casein-chief, without assistance either from the defendant's silence or his compelled testimony:
[I]t is apparent that the principal element in determining whether a
particular demand for discovery should be allowed is not simply
whether the information sought pertains to an "affirmative defense," or whether defendant intends to introduce or rely upon the
evidence at trial, but whether disclosure thereof conceivably might
lighten the prosecution's burden of proving its case in chief. Although the prosecution should not be completely barred from pretrial discovery, defendant must be given the same right as an
ordinary witness to show that the disclosure of particular information could incriminate him.
An ordinary witness need not actually prove the existence of
an incriminatory hazard as that would surrender thr very protection which the privilege against self-incrimination wE •designed to
guarantee. Instead, the privilege forbids compelled disclosures
which could serve as a "link in a chain" of evidence tending to
establish guilt of a criminal offense; in riling upon a claim of
privilege, the trial court must find that it clearly appears from a
consideration of all the circumstances in the case that an answer to
the challenged question
cannot possibly have a tendency to incrimi32
nate the witness.
The court hypothesized several situations in which the information
sought might provide "an essential link" in the prosecutorial chain of
evidence. 33 Since the discovery order was not limited to any particular
defense or category of witnesses from which the court might assess the
incriminatory nature of the information, it was found to violate the Fifth
Amendment privilege. The court did not, however, entirely disapprove
Jones:
We do not intend to suggest that the prosecution should be
barred from any discovery in this, or any other, case. A reasonable
demand for factual information which, as in Jones, pertains to a
particular defense or defenses, and seeks only that information
which defendant intends to introduce at trial, may present no
only, there being no provision for disclosure of names, addresses, or expected testimony of
defense witnesses. Id.
31. Id. at 323, 466 P.2d at 675, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
32. Id. at 326, 466 P.2d at 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
33. For example, pre-trial disclosure of a self-defense witness in a murder case might
provide the prosecution with its only eyewitness to the homicide, and pre-trial disclosure of a
witness who would testify that the defendant committed a lesser included offense but whom
defendant intended to call only as a last resort would directly incriminate defendant as to the
lesser offense. Id. at 327, 466 P.2d at 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
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substantial hazards of self-incrimination and therefore justify the
trial judge in determining that under the facts and circumstances in
the case before him it clearly appears that disclosure cannot possibly tend to incriminate defendant.34
Although the door opened in Jones was not closed, passage was clearly not
available to every intruder. The majority left room for prosecutorial discovery in cases meeting the following criteria: (1) the demand is reasonable
and relates to a particular defense or defenses; (2) the order is limited to
information that the defendant intends to introduce at trial; and (3) the trial
court has found from a review of the facts and circumstances in the case that
the disclosures ordered cannot possibly tend to incriminate the defendant,
that is, to lighten the prosecution's burden of proving its case.
Two months later, in Williams v. Florida35 the United States Supreme
Court upheld Florida's notice-of-alibi rule against a claim that it violated the
Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. That rule
required a defendant, upon written demand of the prosecuting attorney, to
give notice in advance of trial if the defendant intended to raise an alibi
defense, and to furnish the prosecutor with information as to the place where
he claimed to have been and with the names and addresses of the alibi
witnesses he intended to use. In exchange for this information, the state was
required to notify the defendant of any witnesses it proposed to offer in
rebuttal. Both sides were under a continuing duty to disclose the specified
information as it became available. As a sanction for failure to comply, the
rule provided for exclusion of the alibi or rebuttal evidence at trial, with the
36
exception of defendant's own testimony.
Noting the ease with which an alibi can be fabricated, the legitimacy of
37
the state's interest in protecting itself against an "eleventh-hour defense,"
and the wide acceptance of notice-of-alibi provisions in many jurisdictions,
the United States Supreme Court found no violation of due process. "The
adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game
in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until
played.' '38 With respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, the court in Williams adopted the rationale of the Jones
majority. Although disclosed information is often testimonial and at times
incriminating, the court concluded that it could not be considered compelled:
At most the rule only compelled petitioner to accelerate the
timing of his disclosure, forcing him to divulge at an earlier date
34. Id.

35. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
36. Id. at 80.
37. Id. at 81.

38. Id.at 82.
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information that the petitioner from the beginning planned to divulge at trial. Nothing in the 5th Amendment privilege entitles a
defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the
state's case before announcing the nature of his defense, any more
than it entitles him to await the jury's verdict on the state's case-in39
chief before deciding whether or not to take the stand himself.
In a strong dissent, Justice Black expressed his fear that the Jones rationale
provided a basis for extension of discovery far beyond alibi defenses:
The rationale of today's decision is in no way limited to alibi
defenses, or any other type or classification of evidence. The
theory advanced goes at least so far as to permit the state to obtain
under threat of sanction complete disclosure by the defendant in
advance of trial of all evidence, testimony, and tactics he plans to
use at the trial. In each case the justification will be that the rule
affects only the "timing" of the disclosure, and not the substantive
decision itself. 0
By the end of 1970, it was thus clear that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination did not always foreclose discovery by
the prosecution in a criminal case. 4 ' A properly drawn notice-of-alibi rule or
statute would survive an attack based upon the federal Constitution; the door
was open for discovery of certain other defenses. Yet the question remained:
Would the California Supreme Court in interpreting the self-incrimination
privilege of the California Constitution be-content with the meaning given
the Fifth Amendment privilege by the United States Supreme Court? If not,
could a narrowly drawn order aimed at discovery of alibi or other defenses
satisfy the Prudhomme standard? When Chief Justice Wright joined the
California Supreme Court, he was presented with this dilemma.
B. The Two-Way Street as Creating or Curing the Balance
In Reynolds v. Superior Court,42 the California Supreme Court indicated that it would not be content to limit the California constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination to the scope given the Fifth Amendment
39. Id. at 85.
40. Id. at 114 (Black, J., dissenting in part).
41. In two subsequent decisions, however, the United States Supreme Court made it clear
that the privilege against self-incrimination was not to be disregarded during discovery. In
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1971), the Court invalidated a state statute requiring a
defendant, if he intended to testify, to do so before any other defense witness because it placed
a heavy burden on defendant's right not to testify by exacting a price for his silence. In Wardius
v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973), the Court struck down Oregon's notice-of-alibi statute because
it did not give the defendant a corresponding right to discover the state's rebuttal evidence. The
Court concluded in that case that due process poses limits to prosecutorial discovery: "It is
fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case while. ..
subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence
which he disclosed to the state." Id. at 476.
42. 12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974).
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privilege by the United States Supreme Court. In that case, the superior
court granted the state's motion for discovery, which directed the defendant
to give at least three days' notice of calling any alibi witness at trial, together
with names, addresses, and telephone numbers of such witnesses. The
prosecution was in turn ordered to provide the defendant with any evidence
impeaching the alibi witnesses. The court's sanction provided for the exclusion at trial of any witness' testimony or other evidence covered by the order
that had not been disclosed. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Wright
first reviewed the relevant authorities since Jones and concluded that the
order under review "presented delicate and difficult questions of constitutional law, both state and federal." 4 3 With respect to state constitutional
questions, he reasoned:
While Williams may have laid to rest the contention that
notice-of-alibi procedures are inconsistent with the federally
guaranteed privilege against self-incrimination, this privilege is also
secured to the people of California by our state Constitution,
whose construction is left to this court, informed but untrammelled
by the United States Supreme Court's reading of parallel federal
provisions."
Since Prudhomme's more stringent standard was, in part, based upon the
California Supreme Court's reading of pre- Williams federal law, Chief
Justice Wright maintained "that Prudhomme put this court on record as
being considerably more solicitous of the privilege against self-incrimination than federal law currently requires." 45 Accordingly, the court would
have to address the validity of a notice-of-alibi procedure under the California Constitution were it to establish such a rule.
With respect to federal constitutional questions, Chief Justice Wright
found that the order under review failed to meet the criteria of fundamental
fairness in two respects. First, it did not require the prosecution to name
with specificity the time and place of the alleged crimes for which the
defendant might offer alibis. Second, the order did not provide for a
reciprocal discovery right as recently mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Wardius v. Oregon;46 that is, there was no requirement that
the prosecution furnish the names and addresses of witnesses who would be
called to rebut the alibi defense. 47 Thus, even if the court were to find the
43. Id. at 842, 528 P.2d at 49, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 441.

44. Id.
45. Id. at 843, 528 P.2d at 50, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
46. 412 U.S. 470 (1973). See note 41 supra.
47. Although the trial court indicated its willingness to comply with Wardius, Chief
Justice Wright noted that that case required a greater degree of predictability when reciprocal
disclosure beyond the text of the order is to be relied upon for validation. 12 Cal. 3d at 845, 528
P.2d at 52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
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order consistent with the California Constitution, it would necessarily have
to restrain enforcement absent compliance with the required reciprocal
discovery. In determining what was required, the court would be creating by
judicial act "a comprehensive notice-of-alibi procedure for California
courts";4 this Chief Justice Wright was hesitant to do. He noted, in
particular, the difference between the prescription of judicial procedures that
were necessary to protect constitutional guarantees and the design of procedures that were permissible in spite of constitutional rights or guarantees:
"In the former instance, constitutional principles guide the court's hand; in
the latter instance constitutional principles may well have to sfay the court's
hand." 4 9 Chief Justice Wright was therefore reluctant to "present this court
with a conflict between its role as a common law rule-maker and its role as a
50
constitutional umpire."
Other jurisdictions had established notice-of-alibi procedures either by
statute or by vesting rule-making authority in their supreme courts through
their state constitutions. The notice-of-alibi procedure in the federal courts
was established by amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
rather than by the United States Supreme Court under its inherent supervisory powers. The California Supreme Court, however, has no quasi-legislative rule-making powers and the Judicial Council is vested with only limited
powers, because its rules are subordinate to statutory law. 51 Accordingly,
Chief Justice Wright concluded in Reynolds:
[D]ue regard for this court's function as a constitutional adjudicator, and solicitude for this state's governmental scheme of
shared legislative and judicial responsibility for the sound administration of justice, render it inappropriate
for us to create
by judicial
i
courts.J
California
decision a notice-of-alibi procedure for
While Reynolds did not explicitly reject either the reasoning or the
holding of Jones, it raised serious doubts concerning the continued validity
of the Jones principles. First, Reynolds strongly implied that the stricter
Prudhomme standard would be applied if the court were to rule on the
merits. Had the court looked upon the protections provided by the Fifth
Amendment of the federal Constitution and those provided by the California
constitutional privilege as identical, it probably would not have found such
"delicate and difficult questions" of state constitutional law. Second, al48. Id.
49.

Id.

at 846, 528 P.2d at 52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 444. This principle was later applied by

Chief Justice Wright in another context-an invitation to rewrite the California death penalty
statutes to conform with subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions. See Rockwell v.
Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 445-46, 556 P.2d 1101, 1116, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 665 (1976).

50. 12 Cal. 3d at 847, 528 P.2d at 54, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
51. Id. at 849 n.23, 528 P.2d at 55 n.23, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 447 n.23.
52. Id. at 849-50, 528 P.2d at 55, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
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though the court did not question the validity of Jones' recognition of the
inherent power of the court to provide for the orderly administration of
justice through judicially declared rules of criminal discovery, it plainly
to develop
rejected language in Jones indicating that it is no less appropriate
53
prosecutorial discovery rules than defense discovery rules.
It is ironic that the question left open in Reynolds with respect to the
continuing validity of the strict Prudhomme standard would be answered by
a case that did not involve a prosecutorial discovery order. In Allen v.
Superior Court,54 the trial court on its own motion ordered both the people
and the defendant to disclose, on the day of trial, the names of prospective
witnesses so that any potential juror's acquaintance with them might be
ascertained. The court advised counsel that the names would not be identified to the jurors as defense or prosecution witnesses and also proposed to
enjoin the prosecutor from contacting any individual named by the defense
until the name of such person was otherwise disclosed during the course of
the trial. Chief Justice Wright, writing for the majority, found that the order
of disclosure violated the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by
the California Constitution, resting his decision on the standards previously
set forth in Prudhomme.55 Moreover, he rejected the contention that the
application of that standard should depend on the importance of the competing governmental interests, which in this case were the interests in securing
a trial by an unbiased jury and in avoiding the possibility of trial disruption.
"[Such a] proposition suggests a balancing test in which the state's interest
is weighed against and may offset the accused's interest in the risk of selfincrimination. The Prudhomme standard leaves no room for a balancing of
interests.'"56 The Chief Justice also rejected a limitation of the Prudhomme
test to either pre-trial discovery orders or discovery orders resulting from a
motion by the prosecutor.
Applying these principles, Chief Justice Wright found that the trial
judge had failed to make the requisite inquiry and that if the court had so
inquired, it would have found that the disclosure might possibly have tended
to incriminate the defendant. Like Prudhomme, the order covered the names
of all witnesses and was not limited to any particular defense; revealing the
names of witnesses could thus reveal the nature of the defense. Unlike
Prudhomme, the order did not encompass the addresses of prospective
witnesses, and the prosecution was enjoined from contacting the witnesses
until their names were otherwise revealed in the course of the trial.
53. See Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 59, 372 P.2d 919,921,22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 881
(1962).
54. 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1976).

55. Id. at 525, 557 P.2d at 68, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
56. Id.
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Nevertheless, Chief Justice Wright pointed out that names of witnesses
ordinarily lead to their addresses and that the restriction on witness contact
would not preclude investigation of other matters suggested by those names,
which could then 57lead to details of the defenses and to impeachment or
rebuttal evidence.
Supporters of the two-way street rationale find little comfort in Allen.
Allen is not just another example of judicial resort to independent state
grounds. The holding in Jones rested on the California Constitution. By
rejecting the rationale of that case, Allen represented a reinterpretation of
the California constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Allen also
appears to view the Prudhomme standard in a more severe light than the
Prudhomme court itself did. While the court in the latter case reaffirmed the
validity of Jones and expressly recognized that some discovery orders could
pose "no substantial hazards of self-incrimination," 58 the Allen court
neither referred to Jones nor alluded to such a possibility. In applying the
Prudhomme test to the facts, Allen relied upon hypotheticals that suggested
that any required disclosure of defense information or evidence would
violate the standard.
For example, if the defense witnesses identified are friends or
relatives of an accused, the prosecution can anticipate an alibi
defense; if police officers, the defense of entrapment can be projected. The trial judge's qualification of the instant order in no way
57. Justice Sullivan viewed the rationale of Prudhomme as too limited. He concurred in
the judgment on the ground that an accused should not be compelled to provide information

before the prosecution has made its case against him. 18 Cal. 3d at 527, 557 P.2d at 68, 134 Cal.
Rptr. at 777 (Sullivan, J., concurring). Justices Clark and McComb dissented, taking the
position that the California privilege should not be interpreted more broadly than the federal
privilege. Id. at 534, 557 P.2d at 72, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 781 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice
Richardson dissented, finding himself in a position "at a point roughly midway between that of
the majority and that of the dissent." Id. at 527, 557 P.2d at 68, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 777

(Richardson, J., dissenting). First, in the absence of strong countervailing circumstances or
policy reasons, Justice Richardson would "defer to the leadership of the nation's highest court
in its interpretation of nearly identical constitutional language, rather than attempt to create a
separate echelon of state constitutional interpretations ....
" Id. at 529, 557 P.2d at 70, 139
Cal. Rptr. at 779 (quoting People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 119, 545 P.2d 272, 284, 127 Cal.

Rptr. 360, 372 (1976) (Richardson, J., dissenting)). While not necessarily advocating that
Prudhomme be overruled, Justice Richardson would not adopt its strict test without further
analysis of the recent United States Supreme Court decisions and of the possibility of adopting

a position between the rationale of those decisions and the reasoning of Prudhomme. Assuming
acceptance of the Prudhomme standard, however, he did not feel that the order in Allen
violated 'it. "mhe freest speculation yields little to support any fear of self-incriminations";
advance disclosure of potential witnesses would provide only "the barest indication of possible
defenses." Id. at 531-32, 557 P.2d at 71, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 780. In addition, the order restricting

witness contact would allow the prosecution only a few additional days in which to investigate
potential witnesses to accumulate impeachment evidence, an opportunity the state may have in
any event when the defendant presents his case and the names of his witnesses become known.
58. Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320,327,466 P.2d 673,678, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129,

134 (1970).
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prevents the People from investigating the background of the designated witnesses or questioning their friends or acquaintances. Such
investigation may reveal the details of the alibi or other defenses,
or may yield other evidence useful to the prosecution including
impeachment witnesses, inconsistent statements, and admissible
evidence of specific instances of misconduct by the prospective
witnesses.5 9
It is difficult to conceive of a defense disclosure order that would not enable
the prosecutor to "anticipate" or "project" a particular defense or that
might not lead to some "details" of a particular defense or to some
"impeachment" evidence.
It is doubtful, however, that Chief Justice Wright meant to eliminate all
procedures that require advance notice of an asserted defense, or, more
particularly, to sweep away the long-recognized requirement of advance
notice of an insanity defense. 6° The language of the Prudhomme standard
refers to the possibility that the disclosures might lighten the prosecutor's
burden of proving its case-in-chief; this may be interpreted to mean that
evidence that would be of no value to the state in its own case, although
possibly helpful for impeachment or rebuttal purposes, would not fall within
the prohibition of the standard. The brief opinion in Allen does not touch
upon these conundrums.
H.

The Future of Mutual Discovery

A. Purposes of Privilege
In view of the current uncertainty and the breadth of interpretation left
to the court in the area of prosecutorial discovery, it is important to ask
whether the court should re-examine the principles stated by Chief Justice
Wright. Should the implications of Allen be adopted or should the court
endeavor to raise Jones from the ashes and recognize some mutuality in
criminal discovery? In order to answer this inquiry, the purposes of the
privilege against self-incrimination must first be examined. This is itself a
formidable undertaking, particularly in light of the extensive development
of other constitutional guarantees that serve to protect overlapping of sometimes identical values. 61 Yet, of the many reasons for the privilege, two are
paramount. By depriving the state of any authority to compel self-incriminating disclosures, the privilege (1) prevents brutality, torture, and
other forms of abusive and inhuman treatment of an individual at the hands
of the state's agents; and (2) maintains a system of proof by which the state
59. 18 Cal. 3d at 526 n.4, 557 P.2d at 68 n.4, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 777 n.4.
60. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1977).
61. See McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 193, 194
[hereinafter cited as McKay].
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is forced to "shoulder the entire load." 62 In the first instance, official
misconduct arises most often in extra-judicial contexts, such as police
interrogations. The preventative function of the privilege, therefore, has
little to do with judicially-controlled discovery, which arises in the environment of a public courtroom with a reporter and defense counsel present.
In the second instance, however, application of the privilege has a
direct bearing on the judicial process. The conclusion that the state must
"shoulder the entire load" in proving guilt is thought to follow from the
need to serve a number of purposes, such as the need to protect the
innocent, 63 and the preservation of the privilege as the mainstay of our
adversary system of justice.' 4 Such statements, however, are themselves
conclusory in nature. Application of the privilege, at least in the context of
judicial proceedings, has only the most tenuous relationship to protection of
the innocent, and more often frustrates rather than enhances the search for
truth.65 Likewise, the maintenance of our adversary system of justice is only
62.
(1966).
63.
378 U.S.
64.
.. . the

WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2251, at 315-18; see Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414-15
See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
52, 55 (1964).
"[Tjhe American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and
Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7

(1964). "The privilege against self-incrimination . . . reflects .

.

.. our preference for an

accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice." Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
65. "[The] basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-incrimination do not
Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415
relate to protecting the innocent from conviction ......
(1966). See Clapp, PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 541,547-49 (1956);
McNaughton, The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, its ConstitutiotialAffectation, Raison
d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 138 (1960). "The implication
that the privilege protects the innocent at the trial stage must be drastically qualified. It is
unlikely that it will be invoked by an innocent defendant except where he fears prejudicial
impeachment or where he is trying to achieve ends which the law does not recognize as
legitimate .

. .

. [Ilt seems highly unlikely that an innocent defendant, properly advised, will

exercise the privilege in order to avoid prejudice from his unprepossessing appearance, from
his nervousness, his halting speech, or from his inability to cope with a clever or unscrupulous
cross-examiner. The dangers of such prejudices are generally more remote than the almost
certain risk of an adverse inference from the defendant's silence." Meltzer, Required Records,
the McCarranAct, and the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 687, 690-91
(1951) (footnotes omitted).
It should be noted that the fear of prejudicial impeachment, the factor relied upon in
Griffin for its conclusion that the inference of guilt from silence "is not always so natural or
resistible." Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). Griffin has been greatly diminished
in California by the recently developed and highly restrictive rules on impeachment of a
defendant by prior felony conviction, beginning with Chief Justice Wright's opinion in People
v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972). See also People v. Rist, 16 Cal. 3d
211, 545 P.2d 833, 127 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1976); People v. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d 79, 539 P.2d 43, 123
Cal. Rptr. 495 (1975); People v. Fries, 67 Cal. App. 3d 657, 113 Cal. Rptr. 759 (1977); People v.
Nelson, 63 Cal. App. 3d 11, 133 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1976); People v. Roberts, 57 Cal. App. 3d 782,
129 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1976).
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as important as the values it perpetuates. These values are premised upon
several notions of individual dignity and worth and of the proper position of
the individual in our society in any confrontation with the government: (1)
protecting individual liberty and privacy; (2) assuring fairness to the individual; and (3) maintaining a civilized and humane procedure for the
contest. Whether the privilege should therefore be applied to prosecutorial
discovery depends upon whether judicially compelled defense disclosure
would impinge upon the values the privilege is designed to protect.
1. The Defendant's Liberty
The belief that citizens should be free from governmental disturbance
66
without just cause is the foundation of our concept of individual privacy. If
individuals could become arbitrary sources of evidence, the government
would be tempted to "intrude too much.' '67 While undoubtedly important in
the pre-accusatory context, this value normally does not require as much
protection when the prosecutor seeks discovery during formal pre-trial
proceedings. By that time the defendant has been charged and counsel has
been retained, appointed, or waived. If the offense is a felony and tried in
federal court, a grand jury has returned an indictment. 68 In most states,
cause to hold the defendant for trial will have been found by either a grand
jury or a magistrate. 69 In a California felony case, probable cause to place
the defendant on trial will have been found by either a grand jury or a
magistrate at a preliminary examination. 7 0 Thus, except in those few cases
66. "There is a strong policy in favor of government's leaving people alone ...

It follows

that the government should not disturb the peace of an individual by way of compulsory
appearances and compulsory disclosures which may lead to his conviction unless sufficient

evidence exists to establish probable cause. Obviously, if the individual's peace is to be
preserved, the government must obtain its prima facie case from sources other than the
individual." WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 317 (footnote omitted).

-[The privilege against self-incrimination requires] the government to leave the individual
alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him," reflecting "our respect for the inviolability
of the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may
lead a private life'...."

Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).

67. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in CriminalProcedure,
69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1197 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein].

68. A defendant charged with a felony in federal court is entitled to an indictment as a
matter, of right. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a). Nevertheless, there is little judicial control over or

review of the nature and quantity of evidence sufficient to support an indictrnent. Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
69. See L. KATZ, L. LirwIN, & R. BOMBERGER, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME 247-365 (1972);
Spain, The Grand Jury, Past and Present:A Survey, 2 CRIM. L.Q. 119 (1961).
70. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14 (Supp. 1955-1976) and CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 737, 738 (West
1970) together require that all felony offenses be prosecuted by either grand jury indictment or
an information following a preliminary examination before a magistrate. The sufficiency of the
evidence to support the accusation is subject to pre-trial review. See People v. Uhlemann, 9
Cal. 3d 662, 511 P.2d 609, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1973); Jones v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 660,483
P.2d 1241, 94 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1971); CAL. PENAL CODE § 995 (West 1970).
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and jurisdictions in which the prosecutor may proceed by information or
other accusation without a review of cause, 7 1 the state's justification for
proceeding against an individual has been demonstrated by the time the
prosecutor requests discovery. Intrusion upon the defendant's liberty is,
therefore, permissible at this stage. And the justification for such intrusion is
even greater after the prosecutor has made out its case-in-chief and the
defendant's motion for a directed verdict has been denied. 72
2. Assuring a FairContest
The emphasis on fairness in criminal proceedings stems from the idea
that the individual standing alone is helpless before the awesome power of
the state. In light of this imbalance, a procedure would not be fair if the state
could, in addition to relying upon its own immense resources, depend upon
the defendant as a further source of evidence.7 3 At the outset of a criminal
case, the advantage lies with the state because of its ability to gain access to
the facts. Generally, the prosecution has both a greater opportunity, including prompt on-the-scene investigations, and more formidable resources with
which to gather and preserve evidence.7 4 Other factors add to the prosecution's strength in the adversary contest. Witnesses may be more willing to
cooperate with the prosecution than with the defense because of their respect
for governmental authority. The defense does not have the benefit of the
search and seizure powers of the police. In addition, the defendant is
71. Even then, if the accused is in custody, he may contest probable cause for continued
detention for trial. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); In re Walters, 15 Cal. 3d 738,593 P.2d
607, 126 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1975).
72. Historically, the primary purpose of the privilege was to prohibit the state from
compelling the individual to initiate his own prosecution: "The old maxim, no man shall be
compelled to accuse himself, which the antagonists of the Star Chamber and High Commission

seized upon, meant to them merely that no man should be compelled to be his first accuser, that
is, to answer without a charge." McCormick, Law of the Future:Evidence, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV.
218, 221 (1956).
73. "The privilege contributes toward a fair state-individual balance. . . . There isa...

strong policy which demands that any contest between government and governed be a 'fair'
one. .

.

. T]he individual may not be conscripted to assist his adversary, the government, in

doing him in. It'would not be a 'fair fight.'" WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2251, at 317-18. The
privilege against self-incrimination reflects "our sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-

individual balance' . . . ." Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). "[T]he
inherent inequality in investigative resources, as between the state and the accused, suggests

. . . that the defendant does not get so much on the total scale when his limited immunity is left
him." Goldstein, supra note 67, at 1197.
74. Even after Williams, the United States Supreme Court recognized that "the State's
inherent information-gathering advantages suggest that if there is to be any imbalance in
discovery rights, it ihould work in the defendant's favor." Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470,
475 n.9 (1973).
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75
severely inhibited from assisting in investigation while in custody.
Nevertheless, the government may not always be in a superior position such
that allowing it to seek information from the defendant would result in an
unfair contest; the balance of power depends in large part on the extent of
the defendant's knowledge of the facts at the plea negotiation or trial stage.
This, in turn, frequently depends on the extent to which defendants can gain
access to the state's evidence. For example, if the defendant is so unaware
of the state's case that he does not know the identity of the witnesses against
him until they are called to testify at trial, any compelled disclosure of
defense information might tip the balance in favor of the prosecution and
upset the fairness of the proceedings. 76 If, on the other hand, the defendant
were able to obtain nearly all the information that the state possesses by
means of pre-trial discovery, from his own investigatory resources, or from
a combination of the two, it would not be unfair to allow limited prosecutorial inquiry into defendant's evidence.
Defense discovery in California is very broad. 77 While a defendant is
not entitled as a matter of right to the prosecutor's entire file, in practice the
liberal rules of defense discovery very nearly achieve this result. All police
and crime reports are provided to the defense automatically within two days
of the first appearance of counsel or a determination that the defendant will
represent himself. 78 All names, addresses, and statements of witnesses,
whether or not they will be called to testify against the defendant, as well as
reports and physical evidence, are generally available by court order on a
proper showing. 79 In addition, most felony cases in California proceed by
way of preliminary examination rather than indictment and the California
preliminary examination, though not technically available as such, is a most
effective discovery device. 80 Before trial, a defendant is entitled to a transcript of the examination and, if indicted, he is entitled to a transcript of the
grand jury proceedings. 81 The prosecution is not only prohibited from
preventing the defense from gathering evidence, 82 it is in certain cases
obligated at the defendant's request and upon a proper showing to actually

75. See generally Note, ProsecutorialDiscovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARv. L.
REV. 994, 1018-19 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ProsecutorialDiscovery].
76. This much was clear to the Supreme Court in Wardius. See note 41 supra.
77. See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra.
78. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 859, 1430 (West 1954).

79. Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423,340 P.2d 593 (1959); Powell v. Superior Court,
48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957); People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956); Vetter v.
Superior Court, .189 Cal. App. 2d 132, 10 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1961). See generally Traynor, supra

note 5.
80.
428 P.2d
81.
82.

Coleman v. Alabama, 339 U.S. 1 (1970); Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 867,
304, 59 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1967).
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 870, 938.1 (West 1970).
In re Newbern, 175 Cal. App. 2d 862, 865, 1 Cal. Rptr. 80, 82 (1959).
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create evidence. s3 A substantial showing of need is required only for a
limited number of privileged or highly sensitive matters. 4 In fact, many
metropolitan courts have established a standard discovery order that is
applicable to most cases.8 5 A defendant who takes full advantage of his
discovery rights would be aware of virtually all the prosecutor's important
evidence when his case proceeds to trial.
By contrast, the prosecution's knowledge of the defense is often very
limited in California since the defendant rarely testifies at the preliminary
examination and the prosecutor cannot otherwise depose him. The defendant will not necessarily make a statement to the police and the police may
not be independently aware of defense witnesses. In such a case, the
prosecution can only speculate on the nature of the defense and on possible
defense witnesses. While some cases readily lend themselves to such speculation, others do not. If, for example, a defendant is arrested at the scene of
a crime, standing over the victim with a smoldering gun, it is most unlikely
that he will claim an alibi; or if a young healthy man is charged with assault
on an elderly woman in her home, it would be surprising if he asserted selfdefense. On the other hand, in the case in which a defendant is not arrested
at the scene of the crime but rather is identified by an eyewitness and no
"solid" circumstantial evidence such as fingerprints connects him to the
crime, defendant has several options. He may admit his presence but claim
lack of knowledge or participation, duress, insanity, or diminished capacity;
or he may contest the accuracy of the identification and present alibi
witnesses. Even when the prosecutor can reasonably anticipate the nature of
the defense, it may be difficult to investigate. For example, the prosecution
would ordinarily not have independent access to sources of information
concerning an alibi or a defense of physical incapacity. Thus, by the time a
83. Evans v. Superior Court, I1 Cal. 3d 617, 522 P.2d 681, 114 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1974).
84. See Pitches v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 522 P.2d 305, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897(1974);

Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 518 P.2d 1353, 112 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1974); Gonzales v.
Municipal Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 101, 136 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1977); In re Valerie, 50 Cal. App. 3d

213, 123 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1975). Even the prosecutor's notes, taken at interviews with his
witnesses, are generally available to the defense. People v. Moore, 50 Cal. App. 3d 989, 994,

123 Cal. Rptr. 837, 840-41 (1975). The work product doctrine presents slight, if any, limitation:
"inhere is presently no standard protecting the prosecutor's work product from criminal
discovery and . . .the applicability of civil standards is questionable." Craig v. Superior
Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 416, 423, 126 Cal. Rptr. 565, 568 (1976). In addition, the California
Supreme Court is now considering the propriety of allowing the defense to depose prosecution

witnesses outside the narrow parameters now provided by CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1335-1345
(West 1970), which allows similar discovery only with witnesses who are about to leave the
state or who are sick or infirm. People v. Municipal Court, 63 Cal. App. 3d 814, 134 Cal. Rptr.
106 (1976), hearinggranted Jan. 13, 1977.

85. See, e.g., Standing Order of the Superior Court of the County of San Francisco, filed
April 26, 1977. See generally J. JENNER, CRIMINAL LAW PRACrICE SERIES: DISCOVERY (CEB) §§
8-9 (1975).
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criminal case proceeds to trial in California, the defendant may often
possess knowledge of the facts that is equal to, if not better than, that
possessed by the prosecution. It would, therefore, be stretching the concept
of fairness to assert that the state's superior position should always preclude
pre-trial disclosure of defense evidence.
Nevertheless, there are dangers in forcing a defendant to choose his
defense before hearing the state's case against him. For example, a defendant charged with assault with a hand gun may tell his lawyer that the victim
was advancing with a knife, that the gun had a "hair-trigger" and went off
when he raised it to frighten the victim, and that he had consumed a
significant quantity of beer immediately before the incident. To force the
defense attorney to select either self-defense, mistake, or dimished capacity
before the state presents its case might result in unfairness to the defendant
and actually hinder the search for truth. Of several viable defenses, the
state's evidence may preclude reliance on some or show that advantage
would best lie with others. Alternatively, only one defense may initially
appear valid, but evidence at trial may reveal support for others. Thus, if
defendant has chosen to rely on diminished capacity and, at trial, the victim
on cross-examination confesses to a history of violence coupled with a
desire to "get even" with the defendant, the defendant would be unfairly
disadvantaged if he were precluded from asserting defenses he was earlier
forced to waive. 86 As Justice Black pointed out in Williams:
Before trial the defendant knows 6nly what the State's case might
be. Before trial there is no such thing as the "strength of the State's
case"; there is only a range of possible cases. At that time, there is
no certainty as to what kind of case the State will ultimately be able
to prove at trial. Therefore, any appraisal of the desirability of
pleading alibi will be beset with guesswork and gambling far greater
than that accompanying the decision at trial itself. Any lawyer who
has actually tried a case knows that, regardless of the amount of
pretrial preparation, a case looks far different when it is actually
being tried than when it is only being thought about.'
By contrast, the state ordinarily has no duty to specify its theory when
more than one alternative exists. In a prosecution for murder in California,
86. The United States Supreme Court has not squarely faced the sanction issue, either in
terms of precluding an announced defense that was required to be disclosed or of preventing
deviation from an announced defense. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83 n.14 (1970). It has

been suggested, however, that such a preclusion sanction would not be unconstitutional: "On
these facts then, we simply are not confronted with the question of whether a defendant can be

compelled in advance of trial to select a defense from which he can no longer deviate. We do
not mean to suggest, though, that such a procedure must necessarily raise serious constitutional
problems." Id. at 84 n.15.
87. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 109 (1970).
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for example, the state need not allege the degree of murder sought, much
less the basis for the degree. Yet, the state may prove first degree murder by
any number of theories: that the murder was premediated, that it was
perpetrated by means of torture, or that it was committed in the course of a
robbery. 88 If the state is not required to specify its theory of the case among
the interests of fairness, the
several alternatives, it is arguable that, in
89
defendant should not be put to the choice.
Civilizing the Contest
The third value, that of avoiding the use of cruel or uncivilized
procedures in the contest between the individual and the state, is probably
the primary justification for application of the privilege to judicially compelled disclosures in general and to prosecutorial discovery in particular. It
is thought that it is inherently inhumane to force an individual to choose
between condemning himself and subjecting himself to perjury or contempt. 9° Either alternative leads to punishment. To leave a person with no
way out-to force him to inflict injury upon himself, to be an instrument of
his own destruction-is cruel. 9 1 This policy applies with greatest strength
3.

88. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1970).
89. In practice, certain defenses are mutually exclusive and will therefore be known to the
defense shortly after formal accusation. A defendant charged with rape who contends that he
could not have committed the offense because he was impotent, is unlikely to assert a consent
defense in the alternative. A defendant accused of robbery who alleges an alibi would not
prosper by asserting self-defense as well. The nature of impotency or alibi defenses are likely to
be known at the outset and unlikely to be confused with others. To require pre-trial disclosure
of such defenses, therefore, ordinarily would not give defendant a tactical disadvantage that
would be considered unfair in his contest with the state.
The same reasoning applies to the insanity defense when combined with defenses such as
alibi that assume the defendant could not have committed the act, at least in jurisdictions that
do not provide for a bifurcated trial procedure. "Where a defendant must argue his insanity
defense in the same proceeding in which his defense on the merits is considered, each may
suffer from the joint presentation. Where other defenses are available, the insanity defense
may only serve to confuse the jury. It is difficult to persuade a jury to acquit with the somewhat
convoluted argument that the defendant did not commit the offense, but that if he did do it, it

was because he was insane. Thus, presenting evidence to show insanity may result, instead, in
convincing the jury that the defendant actually committed the offense." Shadoan, Raising the
Insanity Defense: The PracticalSide, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 533, 538 (1972) (citation omitted).
90. "The privilege against self-incrimination

. . .

reflects

. .

our unwillingness to sub-

ject those suspected of a crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt
."Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
91. "[W]e do not make even the most hardened criminal sign his own death warrant, or dig
his grave, or pull the lever that springs the trap on which he stands. We have, through the
course of history, developed a considerable feeling for the dignity and intrinsic importance of
the individual man. Even the evil man is a human being." E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFrH AMENDMENT TODAY 7-8 (1955).

"Mhe best justification is simply this: It is essentially and inherently cruel to make a man
an instrument of his own condemnation. The human tragedy having evinced as much cruelty as
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where the accused is required to testify before the trier of fact. In the context
of discovery, however, the rules do not force a defendant who desires to
remain silent to testify or to give pre-trial disclosure of any evidence that he
does not plan eventually to present at trial. Moreover, even when a defendant who claims he is not guilty is required to state the nature of the evidence
in support of his plea before trial, the element of cruelty is diminished. On
the surface, at least, the defendant is not compelled to accuse himself;
rather, he is only compelled to explain why the state's charge is unfounded
and if he intends to so declare at trial.
Nevertheless, the humaneness value in judicial proceedings will be
impinged upon to the extent that the defendant is forced to reveal information that, while not self-accusatory on its face, could benefit the prosecution
and thereby lead to the defendant's conviction because the defendant has
been conscripted, though unwittingly, to defeat himself. Chief Justice Traynor would, perhaps, counter that the defendant is not being compelled to
give any information that he did not intend to offer freely at trial. The
implication of such reasoning is that the natural compulsion to present
evidence to overcome the charge is not cruel or unfair and that the acceleration of that compulsion in no greater way leads to defendant's own downfall. The defendant does not in fact face a court-ordered sanction for failure
it has, any nurtured sentiment against sadism is indeed a welcome brake on human passion, a
valued friend, not likely to be discarded for newer ones." Louisell, supra note 6, at 95.
The guilty, however, are the primary beneficiaries of this policy. Of course, it is true that
even an innocent person may be forced into the snares of contradiction by a clever prosecutor
or into revealing collateral information that may tend to incriminate, such as drug usage or prior
felony convictions, and that in a way it is cruel to force one to admit his past misdeeds or his
"tawdry way of life." Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Nevertheless,
judicial control over the scope of cross-examination through rules of evidence requiring a
showing of substantial materiality for the admission of potentially prejudicial matters is available to prevent such examination from descending to a level that could justifiably be called
cruel or inhumane. See generally CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1976); People v. Beagle, 6
Cal. 3d 441,492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1975); People v. Rist, 16 Cal. 3d 211,545 P.2d 833, 127
Cal. Rptr. 457 (1976); People v. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d 79, 539 P.2d 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975);
People v. Fries, 67 Cal. App. 3d 657, 113 Cal. Rptr. 759 (1977); People v. Nelson, 63 Cal. App.
3d I1,133 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1976); People v. Roberts, 57 Cal. App. 3d 782, 129 Cal. Rptr. 529
(1976).
In addition, if the extent of self-accusation or self-condemnation is the measure, the
greatest cruelty would be to compel a judicial confession, particularly before a large audience.
WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2251, at 316. This rarely occurs, however. As is often the case, a
guilty defendant will resort to perjury, thereby avoiding both self-accusation and self-punishment, since prosecutions for perjury at trial are extremely rare. Hibschman, "You do Solemnly
Swear!" or That Perjury Problem, 24 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 901 (1934); McClintock, What
Happens to Perjurers, 24 MINN. L. REv. 727, 752-53 (1940). This is true, of course, providing
the very act of perjury cannot be characterized as self-destructive; but "[tjhe prevalence of
perjury today leads one to doubt that it is thought of by the average witness as a soul-destroying
experience." WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2257, at 317. This author's experience as a trial lawyer
leads him to the conclusion that the situation is no different today.
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to testify or to present evidence on his own behalf; rather, the pressure to
present evidence results directly from the possibility of conviction following
the state's presentation of its own evidence. The compulsion is thus inherent
in our accusatory system and not protected by privilege.
As noted in Prudhomme and Allen, however, acceleration can result in
the disclosure of information that could ultimately lead to other evidence
useful to the prosecution. 92 To the extent that accelerated disclosure requires
incrimination greater in degree or kind than would have occurred during the
normal course of trial, it constitutes an intrusion upon the privilege. This
point was not adequately considered by the courts in Williams or Jones. In
Williams, the court assumed that the prosecution could obtain a continuance
after the presentation of the defense at trial and then obtain the contested
information by interview and investigation of defendant's witnesses. Pretrial disclosure would merely avoid the disruption of the trial that such a
continuance would entail. To the extent that it would eliminate the surprise
and confusion caused by presentation of an unexpected defense, it would
deprive the defendant of a tactical advantage to which he is not legally
entitled in the first place. 93 As Chief Justice Traynor noted, advance disclosure "merely enables the prosecution to perform its function at trial more
effectively." 94 He apparently did not consider, however, whether compelling a defendant to assist in making the prosecutor's rebuttal more effective
could itself endanger the privilege, nor did he consider whether information
that was useful for rebuttal purposes could also lead to evidence that could
incriminate in other ways. Thus, despite the disclaimers of Chief Justice
Traynor and the Williams majority, the acceleration rationale can constitute
an encroachment on the privilege 95 and can be extended to authorize compelled disclosure of any defense and of all evidence that defendant plans to
present at trial. 96
In sum, application of the privilege against self-incrimination to prosecutorial discovery is justified to a certain extent. To compel the defense to
92. Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 526 n.4, 557 P.2d 65, 68 n.4, 134 Cal. Rptr.
774, 777 n.4 (1976); Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 327, 466 P.2d 673, 677-78, 85
Cal. Rptr. 129, 133-34 (1970).
93. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1969).
94. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 61, 372 P.2d 919, 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 882

(1962).
95. While admiring in many respects Chief Justice Traynor's opinion in Jones, Professor
Louisell recognized this point: "The defendant's historic immunity from the need to 'show his
hand' is something less since Jones than it was before. If such immunity is an inherent part of
the privilege against self-incrimination, there has been a new encroachment however small on
the privilege." Louisell, supra note 6, at 98-99 (citation omitted).
96. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 114 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Jones v.
Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 66, 372 P.2d 919, 924, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 885 (1962) (Peters, J.,

dissenting).
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select its theory of the case without imposing a corresponding duty on the
prosecution may be fundamentally unfair. The judicial procedure of accelerated disclosure may pose an implicit threat to the basic value of
humaneness underlying the privilege. What then is the standard by which a
court should determine whether a particular prosecutorial request for accelerated disclosure violates the privilege?
B. The Privilege as a Barrier to Accommodation
In adopting the Prudhomme standard, Chief Justice Wright recognized
the need for greater protection of the privilege than the simple requirement
that the defendant intend to introduce or rely upon the evidence at trial. He
therefore embraced Prudhomme's additional requirement that the compelled
disclosure not have any tendency to incriminate, that is, that it not lighten
the prosecution's burden of proving its case-in-chief. 97 Without controlling
guidelines, however, such a broad standard might encompass all forms of
pre-trial notice or disclosure requirements and arguably overshoot the literal
bounds of the privilege. 98 The name of any defense witness, for example,
might conceivably incriminate by implicating the defendant in the crime
charged or in an unrelated offense. It has been pointed out that, in fact, even
the order upheld in Jones fails the Prudhomme test.' Moreover, mere
notice of an intention to rely on a specific defense, without disclosure of the
nature of that defense or the evidence in support of it, could conceivably
lighten the prosecution's burden by allowing the prosecutor to concentrate
his resources on meeting a certain line of defense.'0° Thus, if the Prudhomme
test is taken literally, the privilege leaves no room for compromise, so
that criminal discovery in California is unconditionally a one-way street.
Jones would, accordingly, be overruled on its facts' 0 1 and the current
97. Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 529, 524-25,557 P.2d 65, 66, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774,775

(1976).
98. To the extent that it encompasses disclosures that would place a defendant in no worse
position than he would have been if he had made the disclosure during trial, the rule seems to go
beyond the scope of the privilege. Nevertheless, it could well be argued that in light of the
inherent problems in proving such a limitation in practice, see notes 172-73 and accompanying
text infra, the rule must necessarily extend somewhat beyond the privilege in order to protect it
entirely.

99. See Note, Prosecutor'sRight to Discovery, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 225, 228-29 (1971).
100. Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 526 n.4, 557 P.2d 65, 68 n.4, 134 Cal. Rptr.
774, 777 n.4 (1976); cf. Comment, The Rise and Fall of California'sNotice of Alibi Rule:
Procedural Innovation Yields to Judicial Restraint, 9 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 392, 417 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Notice of Alibi Rule].
101. While the Jones facts were peculiar to that case, in that the defendant had revealed the
nature of his defense in asking for a continuance, the court did not appear to place any
significance on this disclosure. Similarly, the Prudhomme court did not take note of this fact,
although it stated that the court allowed discovery in Jones because of a "conviction that such
information could not possible incriminate." Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320,326,

Fall 1977]

PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY

requirement of a pre-trial notice of insanity defense would be unconstitutional. 10 2 But did Chief Justice Wright in the Reynolds and Allen opinions
intend that the Prudhomme test be interpreted as an absolute standard?
Most fundamental constitutional rights protect a number of heterogeneous values that vary in importance according to the setting in which the
right is asserted. Chief Justice Wright recognized in other contexts that
neither constitutional principles nor judicially-created protective rules
should be applied in an identical fashion in every factual environment. 103
Moreover, no constitutional principle is absolute; each has its qualifications
and limits, in recognition of both important competing values and of the fact4
that each right serves its own values most directly in a particular context.t1
At the outset, the privilege against self-incrimination, as embodied in both
the Fifth Amendment and the California Constitution, is limited by its own
terms-it applies only to "criminal" cases. The assessment of the parameters of the privilege has historically involved a process by which the interests
protected by the privilege are defined and balanced against legitimate but
countervailing governmental objectives. 105 Numerous qualifications of the
privilege have emerged by this process; foremost among them are the
following: (1) the limitation to "testimonial" evidence;106 (2) the availabil466 P.2d 673, 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1970). Nevertheless, it could be argued that the
defendant need not have disclosed the nature of his defense in asking for a continuance and
that, having voluntarily done so, the additional information demanded would not tend to
incriminate him. This argument is not convincing, however. Certainly, the information that the
court required the defendant to disclose would be much more likely to incriminate than mere
notice of an impotency defense. See note 148 and accompanying text infra.
102. See generally Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520,1533,1 557 P.2d 65, 72, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 774, 781 (1976) (Richardson, J., dissenting); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West 1954).
103. In re Love, 11 Cal. 3d 179, 191, 520 P.2d 713, 720, 113 Cal. Rptr. 89, 96 (1974) (holding
that "on balance" due process does not provide for an absolute right to counsel at a parole
revocation hearing); Drumgo v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 930, 506 P.2d 1007, 106 Cal. Rptr. 631
(1973) (holding that an indigent's right to appointment of counsel at trial does not include the
right to select a particular attorney). Compare People v. Edwards, 18 Cal. 3d 796, 557 P.2d 995,
135 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1976) with In re Strum, 11 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974)
and In re Podesto, 15 Cal. 3d 921, 544 P.2d 1297, 127 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1976).
104. Even when a classification affects a fundamental right, it may nevertheless be valid if
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest and, though the government's burden
of justification may be heavy, the test nevertheless involves "a matter of degree." Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625-30
(1969); see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,487 P.2d
1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). First Amendment interests are often similarly weighed against
competing interests. See Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 532, 557 P.2d 65, 71, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 774, 780 (1976) (Richardson, J., dissenting) and cases cited therein.
105. See WIGMORE, supra note 3, §§ 2250-51; Comment, The Self-Incrimination Privilege:
Barrier to Criminal Discovery?, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 135, 136 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Barrier
to Discovery].
106. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2263, at 378-79. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973);
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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ity of immunity from compelled testimony; 10 7 (3) the inapplicability of the
privilege to corporations, associations, or even formal partnerships;10 8 (4)
the recognition that certain record-keeping or reporting requirements will
not violate the privilege although clearly incriminating; 10 9 and (5) the
recently stated view of the United States Supreme Court that the privilege is
"personal" and limited to "personal compulsion."'' 10
Chief Justice Wright also recognized that the privilege is not unqualified and that accommodation between the values protected by the privilege
and legitimate governmental interests may at times be required. Accepting
the limitation of the privilege to criminal actions, he refused to find that
certain penalties, although characterized as civil in form, were nevertheless
"quasi-criminal" in nature' 1 ' for purposes of the privilege.1 1 2 This result
obtained even though the penalties in question constituted a severe punitive
exaction by the state, were intended as a deterrent against future miscon3
duct, and were closely connected to a criminal scheme of enforcement."1
Furthermore, in People v. Superior Court (Kaufman), 1 4 the Chief Justice
agreed to authorize trial courts to grant immunity to civil defendants in order
to compel deposition testimony in the face of a claim of incrimination. In
that case, he was influenced by the "imperative to effect an accommodation
that will permit government to collect vitally needed information without
impairing the purposes of the privilege." 115 It is clear that the form of
immunity authorized was not a complete substitute for invocation of the
privilege, and thus, amounted to some qualification of it. In fact, Chief
Justice Wright characterized the offered immunity as "a form of accommo107. Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972); Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
108. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
109. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948);
cf. Gardner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976).

110. Compare Andreson v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391 (1976); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz,
416 U.S. 21 (1974) and Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) with People v. Bais, 31 Cal.
App. 3d 663, 107 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1973) and People v. Chavez, 33 Cal. App. 3d 454, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 157 (1973).
1Il. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 660, 634 (1886); accord, People v. One 1960 Cadillac
Coupe, 62 Cal. 2d 92, 396 P.2d 706, 41 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1964); see Note, New Limitationson the

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 554, 564-73 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
New Limitations].
112. People v. Superior Court (Kaufman), 12 Cal. 3d 421, 429-33, 525 P.2d 716, 721-24, 115
Cal. Rptr. 812, 817-20 (1974); see Segretti v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 878, 544 P.2d 929, 126 Cal.

Rptr. 793 (1976).
113. See New Limitations, supra note I11, at 564-73.
114. 12 Cal. 3d 421, 525 P.2d 716, 115 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
115. Id. at 428, 525 P.2d at 720, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 816 (quoting McKay, supra note 61, at

204).
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dation which provides the appropriate resolution of the conflicting interests
11116

In construing the scope of the privilege, inquiry is perhaps best focused
on the relative weight to be given the various values served by the privilege
as against competing governmental interests. While stating in Allen that the
privilege leaves no room for such balancing, Chief Justice Wright noted that
the state interest involved in that case could have been served by measures
7 It is one thing to treat the
that were not likely to infringe on the privilege. 11
privilege as absolute and quite another to be solicitous of the privilege,
giving its values considerable weight in competition with valid state interests. This is particularly true when substantial infringements on the privilege
are not necessary to serve the state interests at hand. The values served by
the privilege need not be regarded as controlling nor the concerns of the state
as irrelevant in order to disagree in many cases with the view that "the mere
possibility of incrimination is insufficient to defeat the strong policies in
favor of a disclosure .. .."118
C. Dangers to the Privilege
When disclosure is likely to be made in the course of a trial, it is not the
prospect of immediate incrimination alone that endangers the privilege. The
danger from accelerated defense disclosure varies not only with the degree
of incrimination posed by its fruits, that is, the extent to which it implicates
the defendant in criminal activity, but in large part with the manner and
116. Id. (quoting Byers v. Justice Courts, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 1049, 458 P.2d 465, 472, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 553, 560 (1969), vacated sub nom. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971)). While it
appears that Chief JusticeWright considered the form of immunity as having the same scope
and effect as assertion of the privilege, see 12 Cal. 3d at 428 n.5, 525 P.2d at 721 n.5, 115 Cal.
Rptr. at 817 n.5, even full use plus derivative use immunity constitutes some encroachment on
the privilege. In practice, because of the difficulty of tracing the source of trial evidence, this
immunity alone is often an insufficient substitute for invocation of the privilege. Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 470-71 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). It has been noted that
immunity does not shield the defendant from the personal disgrace or odium that often
accompanies one's admission of criminal conduct. McKay, supra note 61, at 205. In addition, it
is not clear that the immunity considered in Kaufman was as broad as that required by the Fifth
Amendment. For example, testimony compelled through a grant of use immunity in the face of
a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege most likely cannot be used for any purpose, even for
impeachment. Kastigar v. United States, 306 U.S. 441, 460 (1972). Nevertheless, in fashioning
an immunity protection similar to that involved in Kaufman, Chief Justice Wright allowed
impeachment use of the evidence in question. People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 892, 533 P.2d
1024, 1044, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 404 (1975). In this context, then, the offered immunity may not
protect the values of the privilege to the same extent as would a claim of privilege at the outset.
See United States v. Frumento, 552 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1977); Note, Use of ProbationRevocation
Hearing Testimony in Subsequent Criminal Trials, 64 CALF. L. REv. 516, 522-23 (1976).
117. Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 525-26, 557 P.2d 65,67, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774,776
(1976).
118. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 428 (1971) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
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purpose of its use. The important question to ask in considering any pre-trial
disclosure, therefore, is the extent to which the values of the privilege will
be endangered by the use to which the accelerated disclosure will be put.
I.

Use in the State's Case-In-Chief
When an accused is compelled to disclose before trial what he intends
to disclose at trial, the values protected by the privilege are most clearly
threatened when the disclosed evidence provides the prosecution with information useful in its case-in-chief. In such a situation, the evidence disclosed
might be sufficient to overcome the defendant's motion for directed verdict
or judgment of acquittal, thereby compelling the defendant either to make a
defense or rest and submit the case to the jury. 19 The examples given in
Prudhomme are illustrative of the type of disclosures that present this danger
most directly; that is, self-defense witnesses and "last resort" witnesses
implicating the defendant in lesser offenses.120 Where the disclosed information is necessary to establish the prosecution's case-in-chief, the defendant may not be subject to conviction unless disclosures are compelled prior
to trial. The first value protected by the privilege, the defendant's libertythe freedom from state intrusion unless and until the government has
demonstrated independent evidence to justify forcing him to proof-would
be severely compromised by such compelled disclosures. The government
would also be free to engage in speculative prosecutions in the hope that pretrial disclosures would reveal information without which the prosecution
would not be able to submit its case to the jury, much less obtain a
conviction. Moreover, the fairness of the procedure would suffer. Since the
state would have the opportunity to use the defendant as the source of the
information required for his conviction, thus the principal instrument of his
own destruction, such a process would also overstep the bounds of civilized
121
procedure and severely intrude upon the dignity of the individual.
119. In California, the standard upon which a motion for judgment of acquittal is considered
at a jury trial is whether the evidence then before the court is sufficient to sustain a conviction
on appeal. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1118-1118.1 (West 1970). The appellate standard has been
phrased as follows: "whether from the evidence, including reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the offense

charged." People v. Lines, 13 Cal. 3d 500,505,531 P.2d 793,796, 119 Cal. Rptr. 225,228(1975)
(quoting People v. Valerio, 13 Cal. App.3d 912,919,92 Cal. Rptr. 82,86(970)). Yet, in moving
for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case, procedural fairness requires
the defense to specify the defect and insufficiency of evidence, such that the prosecutor may
have the opportunity to make a motion to reopen and present witnesses to cure the defect.
People v. Belton, 66 Cal. App. 3d 636, 136 Cal. Rptr. 54 (1977).
120. See note 33 supra.
121. The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether pre-trial
disclosures that support the prosecutor's case-in-chief may be compelled. Williams concerned
use for impeachment and rebuttal purposes only. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1970).
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Use When the Disclosed Defense is Abandoned

When a defendant does not present his disclosed defense at trial and the
incriminating information thus disclosed would not otherwise have been

available, the compulsion of accelerated disclosure can again constitute an
intrusion on the privilege if the prosecution later makes use of the incriminating disclosure. This danger exists both with respect to evidence that
implicates the defendant in the crime charged and to that which connects
him to collateral offenses. In the first instance, although the evidence may

be unnecessary to establish the prosecution's prima facie case and inadmissible for impeachment or rebuttal purposes, it may nevertheless support an
inference of guilt and be admissible even though the defendant has presented
no defense at all. Unable to present the evidence in his case-in-chief, the
prosecutor may save it for rebuttal. After the defendant has rested his case

without presenting any evidence or after presenting evidence not subject to
rebuttal, the prosecution may, with the court's permission, reopen its casein-chief and present the incriminating evidence obtained as a result of the
pre-trial disclosure. 122
In the second instance, the disclosure could lead to the initiation of

another prosecution against the same defendant. Indeed, both circumstances
could arise in the same case. For example, a defendant charged vith theft
and possession of morphine may be compelled to disclose, prior to trial, his
alibi witness who, upon being interviewed by the police, gives information

that reveals that the defendant is an addict and has used heroin. The
defendant then abandons the alibi defense and rests without presenting any

evidence. Although unnecessary to establish the prosecution's case-in-chief,
the prosecutor may nevertheless seek to present the evidence of drug
addiction either initially in his case-in-chief or later by reopening after the
defense has rested. Although the defendant has not presented a defense that
would render the evidence admissible for impeachment or rebuttal purposes,

the prosecutor can argue that the evidence of use and addiction is admissible
to show knowledge of the narcotic character of morphine, 123 and to show
122. In California, the trial court in its discretion may vary the order of proof at trial. CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 1093-94 (West 1970); People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 757, 312 P.2d 665, 675
(1957); People v. Berryman, 6 Cal. 2d 331, 338-39, 57 P.2d 136, 139-40 (1936). This discretion
extends to reopening after jury deliberations have commenced. People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App.
3d 359, 383, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394, 409-10 (1970); People v. Christensen, 85 Cal. 568, 570, 24 P. 888,
889 (1890). It could therefore be argued that it is erroneous to use the terminology "burden of
proving its case-in-chief." Nevertheless, the terminology does highlight the danger that the pretrial disclosure might cure a prosecution's case-in-chief otherwise insufficient to go to the jury.
It also seems a greater affront to the privilege to use the fruits of compelled information
independently, rather than as a rebuttal of a later voluntary presentation of the same information.
123. See People v. Brim, 257 Cal. App. 2d 839, 65 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1968). See also People v.
Gonzales, 262 Cal. App. 2d 286, 68 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1968).
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intent and motive for the theft. 24 Through witness interviews, the prosecutor could also gather information that could be used to charge defendant with
such crimes as possession or use of narcotics. Since the defendant did not
present the disclosed defense, the incrimination would not have occurred but
for the accelerated disclosure. The compulsion to accelerate, therefore, led
directly to the incrimination that in turn compromised important values
protected by the privilege.
3.

Use for Impeachment or Rebuttal
In the context of pre-trial disclosure of information useful for impeachment or rebuttal, the question becomes how much more effective the
impeachment or rebuttal evidence will be as a result of acceleration and how
significantly it will intrude upon the values protected by the privilege.l15 It
should be recognized, at the outset, that one of the purposes of pre-trial
disclosure is to render rebuttal more effective; a primary aim of prosecutorial discovery statutes, and one of the public policies relied upon in
Williams, is the avoidance of trial disruption and the elimination of the
tactical advantage derived from calling a surprise witness near the conclusion of trial. Chief Justice Traynor thus recognized in Jones that advance
disclosure would enable the prosecution to better perform its function at trial
in that it would lead to more "effective rebuttal. ' ' 126 While the prosecution
may obtain a mid-trial continuance to interrogate and investigate surprise
defense witnesses, such continuances are rarely requested and judges, in any
event, tend not to grant such requests because the witnesses are usually called
near the conclusion of trial, frequently on the very day the case is expected
to go to the jury. The state's inquiry is thus limited to a "seat-of-the-pants"
cross-examination, which will hopefully draw out inconsistencies in the
defendant's version of the facts or evidence of a relationship with the
defendant from which an inference of bias or fabrication may be drawn.
Furthermore, pre-trial investigation of defense witnesses is likely to gener124. See People v. Conrad, 31 Cal. App. 3d 308, 325-26, 107 Cal. Rptr. 421, 433 (1973). But
see People v. Guzman, 47 Cal. App. 3d 380, 121 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1975); People v. Davis, 233 Cal.
App. 2d 156, 43 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1965).
125. It is well-recognized that an unauthorized seizure of evidence will not prohibit later use
by the prosecution if it would have been obtained in a proper manner in any event. See Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). See also People v. McInnis, 6 Cal. 3d 821,494 P.2d 690, 100
Cal. Rptr. 618 (1972); Lockridge v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 166, 474 P.2d 683, 89 Cal. Rptr.
731 (1970); People v. Eastmon, 61 Cal. App. 3d 646, 132 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1976). In the discovery
context, this principle can be applied with even less threat to the values underlying the rule of
exclusion. Unlike the area of search and seizure, the evidence is actually presented in defendant's case and less speculation is thus required as to the likelihood of it being obtained

independently by the prosecution. Some speculation would, nevertheless, be required as to the
incriminatory fruits of the disclosed information.
126. 58 Cal. 2d at 61, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
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ate more useful evidence than could any mid-trial effort. State investigators
may interview witnesses and even surreptitiously record their statements. 127
Because such investigations normally occur shortly after the crime itself was
committed, witnesses are likely to have a better recollection of events and
less opportunity to speak with the defendant and contrive a statement. The
prosecution may also investigate relatives and acquaintances of the witness
and probe for evidence of interest, bias, or bad character. Armed with such
information, the prosecutor will have time carefully to plan a cross-examination and to subpeona rebuttal witnesses. In addition, mid-trial interviews
are less likely to deter perjury than pre-trial investigation. After testifying at
trial, a witness is more aware of the risk of a perjury and has a vested interest
28
in maintaining consistency in his testimony.
An accelerated disclosure renders both the fabricated defense and the
guilty defendant more vulnerable. But what values of the privilege are
threatened here? The prosecution has already established its case-in-chief by
independent evidence and, with the danger of speculative prosecution significantly diminished, the defendant's liberty weighs less heavily in the
balance. The defendant without a genuine defense clearly faces stronger
rebuttal, but is that unfair? Absent the exigencies of the court calendar and
the practical constraints of the jury trial process, the prosecutor can obtain,
through intensive investigation during a lengthy continuance, much of the
same information from defense witnesses after direct testimony for the
purposes of rebuttal. Rules of exclusion designed to further collateral objectives may prevent meaningful attack on a defense, 129 but unless a particular
constitutional value is threatened, it cannot reasonably be argued that a
defendant has any inherent right to present testimony that is subject to a
weak and ineffective form of investigation.
It might be argued that it is unfair to allow the prosecution a continuance to investigate a surprise witness on the ground that it gives the
prosecution, with its superior resources, too great an advantage. 31 0 Even if
127. In California, this technique is unavailable to the defense when questioning prosecution
witnesses. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 633 (1967).
128. See ProsecutorialDiscovery, supra note 75, at I10.
129. See People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976); People
v. Underwood, 61 Cal. 2d 113, 389 P.2d 937, 37 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1964). But see Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
130. The Allen court seemed to imply that the assumption in Williams "that there would be
no constitutional bar to the prosecutors being granted a continuance following the unanticipated
presentation of alibi evidence" was somehow "not wholly consistent with our interpretation of
the privilege against self-incrimination." Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 523-25, 557
P.2d 65, 66-68, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774, 775-77 (1976). The court gave no basis for this implication,
nor did it refer to any particulars of the Prudhomme standard that it considered inconsistent
with such an assumption.
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the state used all the resources at its disposal, however, it could not possibly
investigate all defenses or discover and interview all potential witnesses,
particularly with regard to alibi or physical incapacity defenses. Since the
state may in no way be faulted for its lack of preparation in making rebuttal,
it seems fair to allow a prosecutor a continuance to investigate a surprise
witness, unless, of course, the defense is denied a similar opportunity. In
light of the broad scope of pre-trial discovery available to the defense in
California, 131 a well-prepared defense attorney is only rarely faced with a
surprise prosecution witness, and in those cases, a continuance should
certainly be available.
Another argument might be that the prosecution, with its greater
authority and resources, would be likely to harass and intimidate defense
2
witnesses, encouraging them not to testify or to alter their testimony. 13
But
that danger is present in the investigation of any case by any litigant; it has
not been shown that the prosecution's investigators present any special
danger in this regard. 4lthough the prosecution's resources and methods of
investigation are often superior, the danger of alteration or suppression of
evidence by prosecution investigators is probably less than that presented by
informal defense investigators who, in practice, may be friends or relatives
of the defendant or even the defendant himself. 133 In any event, the threat
How could it reasonably be argued that the prosecution should not be allowed such an
opportunity? Consider the following experience of a diligent prosecutor: "In a case I recently
tried, the time alibi was based on two defense witnesses allegedly seeing the time on a wall
clock in a jewelry store. It occurred to me that many retail establishments want their customers
to pay attention to the merchandise rather than the time and therefore keep clocks out of view. I
had my investigator go down to the jewelry store with a camera and a notebook. There was no
wall clock and there never had been one. The alibi turned out to be a wonderful piece of
prosecution evidence." R. Altman, Deputy District Attorney of Los Angeles County (1976)
(unpublished prosecutor's trial tactics manual). While the alibi evidence turned out to be highly
incriminating, it was certainly not compelled incrimination and the state, with no previous
opportunity to investigate the alibi witnesses, was certainly not given any undue advantage by
mid-trial investigation. Such investigations are, in any event, often performed by District
Attorney investigators during the course of a trial without any continuance.
131. See notes 77-85 and accompanying text supra.
132. State Bar Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure, CriminalLaw and Procedure,
DisclosingNames of Alibi Witnesses Priorto Trial, 36 CAL. ST. B.J. 480, 487 (1961). The state
bar of California was, for many years, a firm opponent of the requirement of defense disclosure; its traditional opposition to legislative proposals for enactment of notice-of-alibi requirements illustrates the point. Notice of Alibi Rule, supra note 100, at 415-16. In 1971, however,
drafted a comprehensive notice-of-alibi proposal. As noted in Reynolds, the California legislature has continued to reject notice-of-alibi proposals. Most rejections have been at the hands of
the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee. That committee defeated a notice-of-alibi proposal
again last year. (A.B. 3120) (1976 session); conversely, the state bar, in contrast to its traditional
opposition, took no position on the merits.
133. The threat of witness intimidation is one of the gravest problems faced by prosecutors
and by the criminal justice system itself. One prosecutor has remarked that "wide-open pre-
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could be diminished by means less intrusive on the opportunity to investi34
gate and prepare, tools highly critical to the truth-determining process. 1
The defense witnesses could consent to speak with the state investigator, but
only in the presence of the defense attorney or the defense investigator. The
court could, upon defense request, order that the interview with the defense
witnesses be so conducted or, in extreme cases, order that such examination
take place in the form of a deposition-with attorneys and court reporters
trial defense discovery has contributed to, if not created, an almost out-of-hand witness
intimidation problem. We read in the newspapers with alarming frequency of instances of
witnesses being threatened, harassed, beaten and, occasionally, killed. Prosecutors inform me
this is one of the major problems they face. Witnesses are fearful. They often 'don't want to get
involved.' They contrive convenient memory lapses or recant their identifications. Those who
are willing and cooperative often have to be protected for long periods of time at public
expense." Tochterman, Better Balance in Trial Discovery, in PROSECUTOR's BRIEF 1,11 (May
1977).
134. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Wright speaking for the majority in a much later case
seemed to suggest that allowing the prosecution access to defense witnesses generally, even
those already known to the prosecution, might somehow implicate the privilege. In People v.
Hannon, 19 Cal. 3d 588, 564 P.2d 1203, 138 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1977), based upon evidence that a
lawyer had instructed defendant's alibi witness not to talk to anyone until he testified in court,
the prosecution sought and obtained an instruction authorizing the jury to infer consciousness
of guilt from the attempt by the defense to suppress evidence. In holding the instruction
unwarranted by the evidence in light of the failure to show defendant's personal involvement in
any such attempt, the court went on to state that even if the record had contained proof that
defendant's attorney had instructed the alibi witness to remain silent prior to trial, "such
conduct [did] not necessarily constitute the suppression or the attempted suppression of
evidence." Id. at 600, 564 P.2d at 1209, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 891. In holding that the prosecution's
sole remedy when faced with a defense witness who refuses to speak with its investigator is
impeachment on the basis of bias, Chief Justice Wright made the following observation: "It is
apparent that the issue of suppression of evidence arose out of the prosecutor's concern that
Brown might present alibi evidence which could not be impeached effectively on short notice.
In actuality the claimed suppression of evidence was not of evidence which Brown might have
supplied to the People but rather of clues from which the People might have been able to
impeach any alibi testimony which Brown might present at the trial. Thus we see notice-of-alibi
issues lurking behind the suppression of evidence/consciousness of guilt issues we have considered in this case."Id. at 602 n.5, 564 P.2d at 1211 n.5, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 893 n.5 (citing
Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974) and Allen v.
Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1976)).
At the least, Chief Justice Wright suggests that a direct order requiring a known defense
alibi witness to speak with the prosecution prior to trial threatens the privilege and that a
defense attorney's request to a defense witness that the witness not speak with the prosecution
prior to trial is a proper means of protecting the privilege. At most, Chief Justice Wright's
statement appears to cast doubt upon the propriety of even the prosecution contacting unwilling
defense witnesses prior to trial.
Yet, how can it be reasonably argued that the Fifth Amendment privilege is implicated by
thorough prosecutorial investigation of defense witnesses either prior to or during trial with the
aid of a continuance? Certainly no personal compulsion is directed against the defendant: he or
she is not required to do or say anything. To stretch the privilege to the point of preventing the
prosecution from investigating witnesses and other evidence already known to it would remove
a vital tool in the truth-determining process and severely diminish its integrity.
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present-or in court with judicial supervision.135 Through these devices, the
danger of witness intimidation might be brought within reasonable limits
while the prosecutor would remain free to prepare an effective rebuttal.
Fairness, then, is not threatened by a defense disclosure that may assist
the state in making its rebuttal; nor is the final and most important value
protected by the privilege-that the government should not resort to the
cruel process of forcing a defendant to contribute to his own defeat. In view
of the diminished importance of the privilege at this point, any compromise
of this value can only be slight. The defendant has been forced to incriminate himself in only the most attenuated manner by accelerated disclosure.
The value of humaneness deserves consideration in this context but that
value is similarly not entitled to be considered absolute, refusing limitation
regardless of the significance of competing interests.
Careful analysis suggests that while impeachment or rebuttal evidence
directed at the presentation of a previously disclosed defense is often highly
incriminatory, it should not pose a substantial threat to the values protected
by the privilege against self-incrimination. When a defendant presents
testimony, he must expect that it will be tested by thorough investigation as
well as by cross-examination at trial. Accelerated disclosure, which only
serves to provide an opportunity for preparation of a proper rebuttal, need
not pose a significant threat to the privilege.
4.

Use in Narrowing the Issues
Another way in which advance disclosure may threaten the privilege
arises from the nature of the defense itself. The mere specification of a
particular defense, without enumeration of details or of supporting witnesses, focuses the prosecution's attention on that defense, allowing it to
concentrate its investigation and to tailor its case-in-chief. The defendant's
tactical advantage in holding all the defense cards under the general plea of
"not guilty" is certainly reduced. But what values are threatened by merely
narrowing the issues? Reducing the defendant's decided advantage in this
respect would not make the encounter unfair but only more evenly balanced.' 3 6 As noted previously, however, a request that would force a
defendant to choose defenses at the outset and thereafter prevent him from
abandoning or adding to them may be unfair when applied to certain types of
135. Authorization for such a procedure in terms of a "conditional examination" of both
prosecution and defense witnesses is being considered by the California legislature this year.
S.B. 642 (1977 Session) (March 23, 1977).
136. Dean, Advanced Specifications of Defense in CriminalCases. 20 A.B.A.J. 435, 435-36
(1934).
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defenses, in light of the defendant's limited knowledge of the state's case as
1 37
well as his own.
With respect to the purpose of avoiding self-condemnation, an advance
plea alone will generally not lead to witnesses or specific evidence that
could incriminate. While it may assist the state somewhat by lessening the
defendant's tactical advantage, every procedural alteration that affects defendant's tactical position does not significantly threaten the values protected by the privilege.
It is evident then that compelled pre-trial disclosure presents many
degrees of danger to the privilege, some constituting a direct intrusion on the
privilege, some imposing only slight threats to the values it protects, and
others falling clearly outside its parameters. The extent of intrusion often
depends on the way in which the incriminating evidence is used. A compelled disclosure that only tangentially implicates a defendant as a participant in
a crime may severely intrude upon the privilege when it is used by the
prosecution to overcome a challenge to the sufficiency of its case-in-chief,
and when, without it, the defendant would never have been put to his proof
or faced the prospect of conviction. On the other hand, a compelled disclosure that leads to devastating rebuttal evidence may trespass only slightly on
the values protected by the privilege where the prosecution would most
likely have discovered the evidence by independent investigation of the
disclosure after its presentation by the defense. 138 Finally, a compelled
disclosure that merely narrows the issues threatens the privilege even less.
D. State Interests Served by Accommodation
Various legitimate governmental interests would be served by an advance disclosure requirement. The variation here most often depends on the
nature of the defense rather than on the way in which the evidence may be
used to incriminate. A number of general state interests would, of course, be
served by disclosure of every defense. Interests of judicial economy and
prosecutorial efficiency would be furthered by any defense disclosure. A
narrowing of the issues subject to contest at trial would most likely reduce
the need for broad pre-trial investigation, shorten the trial, and assist in
137. One commentator has expressed the view that the prosecutor should be required to
develop all facets of the case rather than concentrate on those elements that will be contested,
thereby permitting him "to aim his efforts at getting a conviction rather than at exposing all
available evidence to the truth-seeking process." Note, Prosecution'sRight to Discovery, 59
CALIF. L. ReV. 225, 230 (1971). Other than providing novices with an exercise in trial practice,
however, there appears to be no rationale for requiring prosecutors to prove elements that are
not contested or in fact affirmatively conceded.
138. See note 125 and accompanying text supra.
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disposition of cases by way of a negotiated plea. 139 In addition, the search
for truth would be furthered by the opportunity for thorough state investigation and the elimination of the defendant's advantage of surprise. Nevertheless, the state interests do not appear strong, much less compelling, when
applied to all defenses, especially in light of the values protected by the
privilege that would be sacrificed. First, as has been noted, 14° many cases
call for a difficult choice between one or more available defenses and it
would be unfair to force a defendant to choose between them without first
viewing the state's case-in-chief. The disclosure of the nature of certain
defenses, and certainly the names of witnesses supporting them, would also
endanger the privilege by possibly supplying evidence to support an otherwise insufficient state case-in-chief. Any defense involving an admission of
presence at the scene of the crime, such as mistake or accident, duress, or
self-defense, might lead the prosecutor to investigate eye-witnesses to the
crime and may preclude the defendant from contesting weak identification
testimony or other evidence establishing his presence.
With respect to certain specific defenses, however, the state interests
appear stronger. These defenses generally are easy to fabricate, difficult to
rebut or disprove, and available to the defense as a last minute surprise
weapon, often shifting the focus of the trial to a single, narrow issue.
Because of these characteristics, it is often contended, although impossible
to prove, that such defenses are used as a vehicle for perjury and as an
avenue of escape for the guilty."'4 For example, the alibi defense embodies
most of these characteristics.1 42 Because supporting witnesses may be
friends or relatives of the defendant, the defense is easily fabricated. Not
being present at the scene of the crime, alibi witnesses cannot be discovered
through normal investigation techniques and their whereabouts are not
otherwise known to the police. There may be no independent witnesses to
the alibi. Since the evidence relating to the defense is almost entirely within
the knowledge or possession of the accused, the alibi is difficult to disprove
at trial. Finally, the alibi defense can easily surprise a prosecutor who
thought his eyewitnesses were stronger than they proved to be and who
43
expected to encounter another claim such as self-defense. 1
139. See generally Note, No Judicially Created Notice-of-Alibi Procedure, 64 CALIF. L.
Rav. 509, 514-16 (1976).
140. See text accompanying notes 86-89 supra.
141. See Millar, The Modernization of CriminalProcedure, 11 J.CpIM. L.C. & P.S. 344,350
(1920); Note, ProsecutorialDiscovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1010
(1972).
142. See Notice of Alibi Rule, supra note 100, at 415.
143. See State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N.E. 656 (1931). In considering the danger of a
false or fraudulent alibi claim "presented by the accused so near the close of the trial as to make
it quite impossible for the state to ascertain any facts as to the credibility of the witnesses called
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Other defenses that share most of these characteristics are those involving claims of physical or mental incapacity, such as impotency, insanity,
and diminished capacity. 4 4 Defenses involving confession and avoidance,
such as a former acquittal, conviction or pardon, commission under a
promise of immunity, and entrapment, however, are not easy to fabricate or
difficult to disprove. A defense involving excuse or justification, such as
self-defense, duress, mistake, or accident, is also usually apparent from the
facts and is rarely difficult to contest. Often, the defendant is arrested at the
scene and circumstantial evidence or independent eyewitness testimony is
available to verify or rebut the defense. Those defenses that rest upon a lack
of personal ability-'"I couldn't have done it because I wasn't there" or
"I wasn't able"-present the strongest governmental interests in favor of
pre-trial disclosure. Such defenses, when compelled to be disclosed pretrial, pose a somewhat lesser threat to the privilege. Investigation and
interrogation of witnesses as to the defendant's inability to commit the crime
normally will not be useful to the prosecutor in establishing his principal
case against a defendant. While the names of self-defense or duress witnesses may assist in establishing the prosecutor's case-in-chief, an interview
with an alibi witness, while providing a basis for impeachment, would
ordinarily not be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief. Even the Prudhomme court did not disturb Jones' conclusion that discovery relating to the
defense of impotence could not possibly incriminate the defendant. 4 5
As recognized earlier, 146 however, even disclosure relating to these
defenses could, in some cases, provide evidence that if used, could violate
the privilege by compelling the defendant to provide testimonial evidence
that would be used to incriminate him and that would not otherwise have
to the prosecution through investigation or normal trial
been available
147
disclosures.
by the accused," the court upheld one of the first alibi statutes enacted in the United States. Id.

at 4, 176 N.E. at 657.
144. The fact that a separate trial phase on the insanity issue is required in California

demonstrates that the issue of extreme mental disability (compare the diminished capacity
defense) can entirely shift the focus of the trial. The defense of alibi, it may be said, is an
example of extreme physical disability.
145. Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320,325-26,466 P.2d 673, 676-77,85 Cal. Rptr.
129, 132-33 (1970).
146. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
147. Consider the following case: The prosecutor's eyewitnesses think a defendant "looks

like" the robber, but are unable to make a positive identification, and only weak circumstantial
evidence connects the defendant to the crime. The case against the defendant, while adequate

to call for a trial, is insufficient to overcome a motion for judgment of acquittal and send the
case to the jury. The defendant plans to present an alibi and through pre-trial discovery has
been forced to disclose the names of his alibi witnesses. The state's investigator interviews the
witnesses and one states that the defendant had threatened him into providing a false alibi. This
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E. Possible Avenues of Accommodation

In balancing the values protected by the privilege against self-incrimination with the state's interests that would be served by an advance disclosure requirement, at least three avenues of accommodation merit consideration. First, the scope of discovery could be limited to the nature of the
defense only; second, the time of disclosure could be advanced only slightly
by allowing prosecutorial discovery after the prosecution has established its
case-in-chief rather than after the defendant has presented his witnesses or
other evidence; and third, a broader form of discovery could be authorized
but with protective devices established to diminish the possibility that
compelled disclosures would be used 48in a manner that would intrude upon
the interests served by the privilege. 1
1. Limiting the Scope of Discovery
The first accommodation would entail limiting disclosure to the defendant's plea; the plea would be required if he wished to assert specific
defenses that claimed personal inability, similar to the California requirement that an insanity defense be specifically pleaded. 149 The possibility that
such limited disclosure would incriminate the defendant, while always
present, would usually be remote. The prosecutor would not ordinarily be
able to discover the evidence the defendant intends to introduce from the
witness is subpoenaed by the prosecutor and testifies to these facts in the prosecution's case-inchief. The case may now be sufficient to go to the jury and to be sustained on appeal. See
Williams v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1144, 458 P.2d 987, 80 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1969); Rideout v.
Superior Court, 67 Cal. 2d 471, 432 P.2d 197, 62 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1967).
In some ways it may be argued that an alibi witness is particularly capable of incriminating
a defendant. It is common knowledge that defendants in criminal courts ordinarily do not come
from the middle or upper classes of our society and that the facts themselves often present the
"seamier" side of life. Since an alibi witness is often previously acquainted with an accused, he
might be in a particularly appropriate position to provide the prosecutor with information
concerning defendant's habits, lifestyle, or activities that incriminates the defendant either in
the crime charged or in other offenses. In presenting an alibi witness to testify, however, the
defense always makes a calculated judgment that the benefits to be derived from the witness'
testimony at trial will outweigh any possibility that the witness will provide information
damaging to the defendant. Because the prosecutor could obtain the incriminating information
if the witness testified for the defendant, it would seem that acceleration of disclosure would do
slight, if any, damage to the values protected by the privilege.
148. Another approach, which might be called "required waiver," has been suggested by a
number of commentators. This form of compromise would entail denying discovery to the
defense unless the defendant waives his special status as an accused and possibly his privilege
as a witness, Goldstein, supra note 67, at 1198; Louisell, CriminalDiscovery:Dilemma Real or
Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56, 101 (1961); BarriertoDiscovery, supra note 105, at 144-45. In
view of the demonstrated need for broad defense discovery, see text accompanying notes 73-76
supra, however, such discovery should not be conditioned on a waiver of such magnitude. See
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1971); People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024,
120 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975). See note 41 supra.
149. A plea of alibi would not, of course, require a bifurcated trial. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
1026 (West 1970).
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plea alone. Of course, it is possible that a prosecutor will interview friends
and relatives of the defendant and thereby stumble upon a prospective alibi
witness, but this may easily occur in the absence of an alibi plea. The greater
likelihood that an alibi plea would motivate a prosecutor to undertake such
an investigation when he would not otherwise do so is vastly different from
giving the prosecutor the details of the alibi or the names of alibi wit150
nesses.
While such a narrow notice requirement may present only a slight
threat of incrimination, more substantial problems arise in attempting to
make the requirement effective. 151 It might be easily disregarded unless the
defendant were subject to some sanction for withdrawing the plea and
relying on another defense. For example, a defendant would have nothing to
lose by routinely entering the plea to keep his options open while maintaining the same freedom he now enjoys under a general plea of "not guilty."
The imposition of a sanction for such withdrawal would arguably be unfair in
certain cases. It is not unusual for a defendant to claim initially, even to his
attorney, that he knows nothing about the crime, and only later, after
observing the evidence against him at the preliminary examination or during
the state's case-in-chief, to admit some involvement. Moreover, the facts
presented in the state's case may give rise to a meritorious defense: the
assault may have been committed in self-defense, the shooting accidental,
the battery committed on police officer acting outside the scope of his
duties, the sale of narcotics in response to police persuasion amounting to
entrapment. Any effective sanction would penalize a defendant by hindering
his assertion of a new defense. While the United States Supreme Court
would not apparently be bothered by the imposition of a penalty in these
circumstances, 152 the prospect of depriving a defendant of a potentially valid
defense because he failed to assert it at the outset appears to be not only
fundamentally unfair but also to constitute a punishment greatly disproportionate to the wrong committed.
The safest approach would probably be to ignore the withdrawn alibi
notice and leave the problem of fraudulent notices to the ethical standards
150. Even the details of the defense alone, for example, the location where defendant

claims to have been, would often lead directly to the names of alibi witnesses and hence to their
location.
Even state courts that are protective of the privilege based on their own constitutions
appear to view the plea requirement as only a highly speculative threat. For example, Reynolds

relied heavily upon an Alaska Supreme Court decision striking down a notice of alibi order on
state privilege grounds, but that court upheld a requirement that an accused give notice of an
alibi defense, regarding such notice as similar to a plea of "not guilty" and finding "nothing

incriminating about this inquiry." Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 787 (Alas. 1974).
151. As noted in text accompanying note 152 infra, the United States Supreme Court has not
addressed itself to the question of an appropriate sanction.
152. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84 n.15 (1970).
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enforced by the legal profession. This approach has been adopted by the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which go far beyond a mere plea
requirement: evidence of an intention to rely upon an alibi defense, later
withdrawn, or of statements made in connection with such intention, is not
admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who gave
notice of the intention. 153 It has the additional attribute of not discouraging
the initial entry of alibi pleas. A more moderate position would allow
comment on the claim, similar to false or evasive extrajudicial assertions.
This would prevent blanket alibi claims while presenting only a minimal
threat to the privilege. Of course, the formulation of a fair sanction for a
defendant's attempt to present an alibi defense without prior notice might
prove difficult, although not impossible. 154 Despite previous notice of an
alibi or other defense, however, a defendant should always be allowed to
rest without presenting any evidence, and to rely upon the failure of the state
to prove its case without the threat of adverse comment. Otherwise, the
asserting the
notice requirement could directly penalize the defendant for
55
privilege in face of a clearly insufficient case against him.1
While the requirement of a special plea with respect to specific defenses may not impair the central values protected by the privilege, this
approach is of limited utility from the state's point of view. It will rarely
assist the prosecution in gathering specific rebuttal evidence; rather, it will
merely help to focus the issues in the investigation and the trial. Nevertheless, by rendering some assistance in making the criminal process more
effective as a truth-seeking device, it does present "an appealing solution" 15 6 to the problem.
2. Minimizing the Acceleration
Another avenue for accommodation would minimize the acceleration
of disclosure required by any discovery rule. Only after the prosecution has
153. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(0.
154. As a sanction for failure to disclose the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure mandates
the exclusion of the testimony of any undisclosed witness other than that of the defendant
himself. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(d). The sanction, however, is permissive only, and for good

cause the court may grant an exception to it. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(e). In California, a
defendant waives the defense of insanity by failing to enter the plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West 1970). In exceptional cases, however, fairness
requires that the defense be available upon a plea entered even after commencement of trial.
People v. Boyd, 16 Cal. App. 3d 901, 908, 94 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579 (1971).
155. Providing an opportunity for prosecutorial comment on a previously pleaded alibi when
defendant rests without presenting evidence not only makes the assertion of the privilege more

costly, see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965), but also increases the likelihood that a
prosecutor with an insufficient case will charge a defendant in the hope that an alibi defense will
be pleaded and later withdrawn, enabling the prosecutor to use the adverse inference to support
his weak case.
156- Notice of Alibi Rule, supra note 100, at 417.
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presented a sufficient case-in-chief would the defendant be called upon to
state the general nature of his defense and to provide a list of witnesses he
will be calling in support of it. 157 Although this requirement, which approximates a limited opening statement for the defense (although not to the jury),
would be contrary to current California law,' 58 it would entail no substantial
threat to the privilege. Freedom from speculative prosecution is certainly not
affected, and with a full opportunity to evaluate the prosecution's case,
required disclosure at this point does not appear unfair. When a defendant
has been able to view the prosecution's case in full and has decided to
present a defense, a requirement that would entail giving the prosecution a
preview of his case should not be viewed as a violation of the Prudhomme
standard. 159 The danger of witness intimidation is minimal, and the possibility is slight that the compulsion itself would incriminate a defendant. At this
stage, it is also unlikely that the disclosed witnesses would lead to incriminating evidence, and, in any event, these witnesses would probably be
called to testify. In fact, it is conceivable that Justice Peters would have
approved of such a rule. His principal objection was to any requirement of
disclosure "until a prima facie case [had] been established"160 or, until "the
prosecution has first made out a case that the accused can or should
16
deny." 1
As with the limited scope of discovery, however, this accommodation
does not substantially further the state interests involved. When the entire
157. A defendant should not, however, be required to state whether he himself will testify.
This is a tactical decision that defendant should be required to make only in consultation with
counsel, uninhibited by any rules requiring him to have given prior notice of such intent. Cf.
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 610-11 (1971).
158. In enforcing the Prudhomme standard, the California Supreme Court has stated that a
defendant cannot be compelled to disclose possibly incriminating evidence "at any time prior to
its actual use at trial." Bradshaw v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 332, 333 n. 3, 466 P.2d 680, 681
n.3, 85 Cal. Rptr. 136, 137 n.3 (1970).
159. In People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976), the trial court, in a
multiple-defendant case, faced the prospect of a defendant testifying over the objection and
without the cooperation of their defense counsel. Fearful that a defendant's testimony in such
form might include evidence inadmissible and prejudicial to the co-defendants, see Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518,407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr.
353 (1965), the court proposed that each defendant initially testify outside the presence of
the jury. Noting that the order was not implemented for the purpose of discovery, the court
concluded as follows: "While an in camera proceeding would give the prosecution a preview of
the defendant's case, that procedure certainly does not violate any constitutional right. Since
appellants had declared their intention to testify, the proposed proceeding was not tantamount
to compelling a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination." People v. Manson, 61 Cal.
App. 3d 102, 161-62, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 299 (1976) (citing Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.
3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970)).
160. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 65, 372 P.2d 919, 923, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 883
(1962) (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
161. Id. at 63, 372 P.2d at 923, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
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defense may be presented in less than a day, as is the usual case, the
prosecutor will have little opportunity for investigation after learning of the
witnesses at the opening of defendant's case. Only in rare cases that involve
multiple defendants, and in which months may elapse after the close of the
prosecution's case but before the last defendant presents his case, would ihe
62
prosecutor have ample time to investigate and prepare.1
3. EstablishingProtective Devices
The last and most ambitious proposal for accommodation is designed to
serve the state interests more effectively by a broader form of pre-trial
disclosure. This approach would require specification of the details of the
defense and the naming of defense witnesses, while undertaking the difficult, dangerous, and burdensome task of formulating and applying strict
protective devices to reduce the possibility that the required disclosures will
incriminate the defendant such that the values protected by the privilege
would be threatened. The difficulty lies in fashioning a judicial order of
immunity to compel acceleration of disclosure similar to that used to compel
grand jury or trial testimony. 163 Such a judicial order would permit investigation of the compelled pre-trial disclosure while prohibiting the use of any
evidence derived therefrom until after the prosecution had succeeded in
independently establishing its case-in-chief. To more completely protect the
privilege, the prohibition should continue unless and until the defendant
actually presents disclosed matters in his defense at trial. The California
Supreme Court in two cases has expressed a willingness to implement
judicially created immunity rules in other contexts in which some accommo164
dation is called for between the privilege and legitimate state interests.
Although the procedures in both cases were not specifically directed toward
162. It is in multiple-defendant cases, however, that fairness may require each defendant to
wait until he is called upon to present his defense before making any required disclosure. A
defendant may be fully aware of the substance of the prosecution's case, but co-defendants in

California are not entitled to discovery from one other. A great deal of uncertainty therefore
remains as to the nature of defenses that will be presented by individual defendants. While most

co-defendants cooperate in a somewhat common defense, such that their cases are mutually
supportive, on occasion a conflict of interest may arise and each defendant may end up acting

as his co-defendant's prosecutor. When this occurs, a defendant may not be aware of the full
case against him until all his co-defendants have presented their cases. Thus, where multiple

defendants are involved, this form of accommodation should require disclosure from each
defendant only when that defendant is called upon to present his case. As such, it provides only
a limited benefit to the prosecutor, chiefly in those cases involving individual defenses lasting

over a period of weeks or months.
163. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
164. See People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975); Byers
v. Justice Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 458 P.2d 465, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1969), vacated sub nom.
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
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the state interests served by pre-trial discovery, the state was allowed to
proceed with a course of action that would have endangered the privilege
against self-incrimination absent some protective immunity.
State interests would be more effectively served by the greater breadth
of required disclosure and, theoretically at least, the defendant would be
afforded a form of protection that would prevent intrusions upon the
privilege in any way. Defendant would be assured that the compulsion
would not force him to assist in establishing an otherwise insufficient casein-chief for the state. Since incriminating evidence resulting from the disclosure could be used only if and when the disclosed information was
presented by the defendant, he would be guaranteed that the compulsion
would not lead to significantly greater incrimination than would result from
thorough investigation of defendant's evidence after its presentation at trial.
Although, in reality, prompt interview and witness investigation is generally
more effective than mid-trial inquiry, any interest that the defendant may
have in avoiding effective scrutiny of a defense would be rendered insignificant once he had presented it, and incrimination would be limited to rebuttal
65
of that defense.
This attempt at accommodation would be dangerous because the practical problems of enforcing the immunity may render its protection inadequate. Strict rules applicable to the prosecution of a witness after he has
been forced to testify under a grant of immunity require that the state show
by clear and convincing evidence that the information upon which the
witness is to be prosecuted was derived from a wholly independent
source. 166 As a practical matter, however, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to test the truth of a prosecutor's affidavit for this purpose. 167 Similar
problems are inherent in the enforcement of a rule that requires the prosecutor to show that its case-in-chief was based upon independent evidence after
he has obtained a pre-trial defense disclosure. The most effective method
would seem to be that, as a condition of discovery, the prosecutor must first
make a record by in camera proof, sealed documentation, or otherwise, of
the evidence in his possession. The court can then be assured that the
evidence presented in the prosecution's case-in-chief was derived from an
independent source. As further protection in unusual cases, the court may be
authorized to deny the discovery request upon an in camera defense show165. See text accompanying notes 125-35 supra.

166. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d
511 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Catalano, 491 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1976). It has been said that
because of this difficulty, any such immunity would be "too hollow a safeguard." Prosecutorial
Discovery, supra note 75, at 1005.
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ing that the information subject to disclosure would lead to severe danger of
incrimination and that intrusion upon the privilege could not be avoided by
the strictest protective order.
The search for an effective means of enforcement points out another
problem with this method of accommodation-its burdensome nature. Proper enforcement of all protective devices may impose a greater burden on
the judicial system than would a substantial continuance. While pre-trial
disclosure may result in more effective rebuttal of a fabricated defense,
harm to judicial efficiency and possibly to prosecutorial freedom1 68 may be
too great a price to pay for the incremental benefits received from a more
reliable process for ascertaining the truth.

Conclusion
In light of the demonstrated difficulty of formulating a fair yet effective
accomodation of the values protected by the privilege against self-incrimination, it is reasonable to conclude not only that Chief Justice Wright meant
what he said when he indicated in Allen that the privilege leaves no room
for balancing, but that he was correct. Any disclosure requirement, even
when not fashioned as a rule of discovery, raises the specter of incrimination
and poses an ominous danger to our adversary system of justice of "stealthly encroachments" 169 under the two-way street rationale. In every attempt at
prosecutorial discovery, one hears Chief Justice Wright repeating the admonition of Justice Peters in his dissent in Jones: "It will not do to say that
the impairment of constitutional rights is only minor in the instant case, and
1 70
for that reason no one should get excited about it."
Yet, Chief Justice Wright would certainly agree that the principles of
the privilege are not rigid and inflexible, intolerant of any adjustment
regardless of the importance of their underlying values when contrasted with
competing interests in a given context. Not every adjustment constitutes an
impairment of a constitutional right. Every accommodation is not, at best,
an unworthy compromise or, at worst, a capitulation to values regarded as
168. The employment of immunity as a protective device may in some cases inhibit effective
prosecution. Faced with the prospect of defendant's argument that the new evidence was
discovered by exploiting the pre-trial disclosures rather than by following up leads from the
defense witnesses' testimony at trial or by independent investigation prior to presentation of the
defense, the prosecutor might hesitate to file formal charges for crimes committed by defendant
but discovered in a pending suit. Similar arguments have been raised in regard to judiciallyimposed immunity rules in other contexts. See, e.g., Cassou, The MorrisseyMaelstrom:Recent
Developments in California Parole and ProbationRevocations, 9 U.S.F. L. REV. 43, 72-73
(1974).
169. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
170. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 67, 372 P.2d 919, 925, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 885

(1962).
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superior by worshippers of expediency. Nor, as far as the balance of power
between the defendant and the state is concerned, does the. Constitution
require that every tactical advantage enjoyed by a defendant be left unaltered. 17I
The operation of discovery rules in the context of the criminal trial
process requires some mutuality in order to maintain the integrity of the
adversary process as a realistic search for the truth.172 Although Jones has
not been overruled, the two-way street of criminal discovery in California
today is a four-lane freeway for the defense and an overgrown and neglected
footpath for the prosecution. Discovery from the defendant had been nearly
eliminated, while discovery for the defendant had progressed far beyond its
1964 limits, when Chief Justice Traynor noted that few jurisdictions had
73
moved as far as California in liberalizing defense discovery. 1
Opponents of any prosecutorial discovery argue that the lack of mutuality in criminal discovery cures rather than creates the imbalance. The right
of discovery must remain unilateral to counter the inherent imbalance in
favor of the prosecution in a criminal case. This view was best expressed by
Professor Goldstein in 1960.174 Yet, when he spoke of the "very serious
disadvantage" 1 75 of the defendant in a criminal case, he was viewing a
criminal process vastly different from that conducted in California today.
The revolution in criminal procedure during the Warren Court era provided
defendants with the essential tools for defense in the adversary context and,
through exclusionary rules designed to serve interests collateral to the truthdetermining process, has given defendants procedural counter-balances that
avoid the impact of incriminating evidence and that are useful both in
negotiating a settlement and in presenting a case to the jury. 176 In terms of
171. The legislative enactment of prosecutorial discovery rules would be much easier from a
political point of view if additional discovery benefits could be conferred on the defense. In
federal court, FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 authorizes disclosure to the defense, after notice of alibi, of
the names and addresses of rebuttal witnesses to which the defendant would not otherwise have
been entitled. In California, a defendant is already entitled to the names and addresses of any
witness placing defendant at the scene of the crime, as well as any witness the prosecution

intends to call at the trial. Thus, as a practical compromise in California, it may be necessary to
tie a notice-of-alibi rule to further defense discovery, such as a greater opportunity to depose

prosecution witnesses.
172. Some degree of mutuality in cases in which the state interests are stronger might also
mitigate further deterioration of public confidence in the legal profession caused by technical
procedural rules that appear to frustrate the determination of the truth and render lawyers "a
sort of people whose profession is to disguise matters." T. MORE, UTOPIA (trans. ed. 1935).
173. See Traynor, supra note 5.
174. Goldstein, supra note 67.
175. Goldstein, supra note 67, at 1199.
176. In California, this advantage in the context of the exclusionary rule of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), includes the ability to testify without fear of impeachment. See
People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
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discovery, California criminal procedure gives defendants information unheard of in federal practice.' 7 7 In terms of knowledge of the opponent's
case, the advantage in California is with the defense. Certainly, broad
defense discovery is required to counterbalance the numerous advantages
the prosecution enjoys as a fact-gatherer, and a limitation upon such discovery should not be considered as an alternative to prosecutorial discovery.
Nevertheless, fairness in the adversary contest does not require a one-way
street for criminal discovery in California.
The task before the state's judiciary is to arrive at accommodations that
will permit prosecutorial discovery while remaining solicitous of the values
underlying the privilege. The safest approach would limit discovery to
specific defenses, such as alibi and physical incapacity, and limit the scope
of required disclosure to a plea only. If details of the defense or names and
addresses of witnesses are to be included, disclosure should be required only
after the prosecution has presented a sufficient case-in-chief. Any extensive
pre-trial disclosure requirement would severely endanger the values of the
privilege, even when limited to specific defenses such as alibi or physical
incapacity, unless effective procedural devices were implemented to assure
that incriminatory information gained from the disclosures would be used
only after the disclosed information was presented by the defense at trial.
Because it will be most difficult to make these protections effective while
avoiding burdensome court procedures and leaving the prosecution free to
pursue legitimate objectives with independent evidence, California would
do well to adopt a "go slow-proceed with caution" approach to prosecutorial discovery. This is the admonition given to us by Chief Justice Wright
in Allen.
177. In federal court, discovery has been expanded somewhat by recent amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. A defendant still has no right to discover unilaterally,

however, the names and addresses of prosecution witnesses, much less their statements or
expected testimony, until they have actually testified for the prosecution in its case-in-chief.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
The 1975 House of Representatives proposed amendments to the federal rules would have
given each party the right to discover the names and addresses of the opposing party's

witnesses three days prior to trial, but the conference committee adopted the Senate version
omitting such a right. "A majority of the conferees believe it is not in the interest of the
effective administration of criminal justice to require that the government or the defendant be
forced to reveal the names and addresses of its witnesses before trial. Discouragement of

witnesses and improper contacts directed at influencing their testimony, were deemed
paramount concerns in the formulation of this policy." H.R. REp. No. 414, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 12, reprinted in [1975] 17 CitM. L. REP. (BNA) 3218. '

